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Migration of labor among countries raises two important issues in 
the economic literature. The first issue deals with factors influencing 
migration or determinants of migration. The second issue deals with the 
consequences and impact of migration on three groups; the sending coun-
tries and those who are left behind; the receiving countries and their 
citizens; and the migrants themselves. 1 
This study of the migration of labor between the years 1960-1977 
addresses mainly to the following two issues: 
1. The determinants of labor migration among 16 Arab states includ-
ing Palestinian labor emigrants from the Gaza Strip, Egypt, Lebanon and 
Syria. 
It is appropriate at the outset to point out the limitations impos-
ed on this issue. In this study, the migration process among the Arab 
states is viewed as a result of economic conditions. Hence, only the 
economic determinants of migration are considered. Non-economic deter-
minants, such as political and social-human factors, although they are 
relevant, are not emphasized in this study though a major-political hy-
pothesis, namely the mobility of the Palestinians as a result.of the 
~ichael J. Greenwood, "Research on Internal Migration in the Unit-
ed States: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, XIII (1975), p. 
397. 
1 
loss of their economic base, i.e. land, resulting from the creation of 
Israel in 1948 and subsequent land acquisitions in 1967, is tested in 
this study. 
2. The consequences of emigration on the Jordanian economy. 
The choice of Jordan as a case to study the impact of emigration 
2 
is well justified for many reasons. Important among these are: Jordan's 
emigrant workers in the oil-rich Arab states are about 38 percent of its 
total national labor force. Jordan ranks first among the Arab states 
according to the migration rate per population. Furthermore, Jordan has 
maintained relatively free mobility of its labor force and a free for-
eign exchange rate throughout the period under study between 1960 to 
1977. Also, workers' remittances comprise a substantial portion of na-
tional income and gross domestic product (about 24 percent of the na-
tional income and 31 percent of the gross domestic product for 1977). 
In this study the 16 Arab states are classified into two distinct 
groups on the basis of resource endowment or income. On the basis of 
resource endowment, the first group is considered as labor-rich (or 
labor abundant) Arab states (LRAS). This group includes Jordan (West 
Bank and East Bank), Egypt, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, and the two Yemens 
(North Yemen and South Yemen). This group is also the low-income group 
and constitutes the labor sending group. The second group which is con-
sidered as the oil-rich Arab states (ORAS) includes Algeria, Bahrain, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). This group is also the high income group, and consti-
tutes the labor receiving group. 
3 
Political Determinants - Limitations 
A study of this nature cannot be complete without at least an at-
tempt being made at the start to enumerate those factors existing in 
the countries being studied, which can in one way or another influence 
the study, if they lend themselves to full analysis and quantification. 
The author must point out here that although he is fully aware of them, 
yet out of choice he has decided to treat t~em as possible limitations 
and leave them out of the study. 
It must be pointed out that states of this study have a common 
history and were at one time or another ruled by the Ottoman Empire for 
long periods. This has given them some common economic, cultural, so-
cial and political similarities. They were divided into the present 
array of states as a result of an era of colonialism which involved 
Britain, France and Italy. Those countries have over a number of years 
become independent states and naturally their national boundaries are 
the boundaries which at one time were set by the colonial powers. The 
only exception is the case of Israel and her neighbors where the lines 
were determined by U.N. resolutions, wars, armistice lines, etc. 
The states in question were basically underdeveloped with minimal 
resources until the discovery of oil. Thus, their economies were basi-
cally agricultural. While Bahrain and Iraq were the first oil rich 
states to discover oil, yet the real development of labor migration 
from the labor rich states to the oil rich states began with the discov-
ery of oil in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In both cases this was made 
possible by the fact that the said countries lacked their bwn trained 
labor force, and their sparce populations. The oil companaes had to 
4 
resort to outside labor. Because of the social and economic similari-
ties of the states of the region it was natural that the flow of migtant 
labor into the oil rich states be from the labor rich states of the 
region. 
By coincidence the best labor pool to supply migrant labor to the 
oil rich states was the large number of Palestinians who, as a result 
of the creation of Israel had become refugees and were available to mi-
grate in search of work. It later become the policy of the United Na-
tions Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) to pro-
vide the schooling and necessary training for the new and subsequent 
generations of refugees who eould fill the jobs available in the oil 
rich states. 
In Kuwait, for example, in 1948, the British were still ruling Ku-
wait and when the oil industry developed and necessitated the growth 
and expansion of governmental services, the British administration was 
more than happy to recruit and employ the former Palestine Mandate 
civil servants who had by then become Palestinian refugees. This also 
became the pattern in Saudi Arabia and Libya as oil was discovered and 
state services and functions were expanded. 
Because of the extended family pattern in the Arab world, this 
early labor migration provided both the beginnings and the necessary 
information broadcast for later groups and generations of labor migrants. 
In one way distance became a non-significant variable. 
There are other factors which influenced labor migrants from the 
labor rich states to the oil rich states then and continue to do so now. 
These factors can be grouped as follows: 
1. Practically all of the Middle East countries studied require 
5 
that a person seeking work abroad to be in possession of an exit visa. 
In many countries policies determine who can leave and who is denied an 
exit visa. In Egypt, for example, the migrant worker had in addition, 
to be in possession of an exit visa, a work permit from a specified gov-
ernment authority before he could apply for the exit visa. In some 
countries the host country negotiates directly with the sending country 
and the agreement reached determines the number, qualifications, and 
other pertinent facts regarding the migrant workers. 
2. The receiving or host countries have also provided a system of 
work permits and entry visas. Politics have also played their part in 
determining who is allowed to work and from what country he comes. 
There were, as a result, attempts made to restrict labor migration from 
certain countries for political reasons. This also was interpreted to 
mean that the host country was free to terminate the work permit and 
the visas of persons, groups, or even whole national units based on po-
litical considerations. This has happened several times in the past in 
the region in question. 
3. Practically all the oil rich states have by law prohibited mi-
grant workers from seeking to change their residence status to that of 
tmmigrants and then proceed to acquire citizenship of the country. They 
also do not allow their migrant workers to own real estate or open their 
own businesses. This has meant that once the work permit of a migrant 
worker expires or is terminated he has to leave the host country. This 
has resulted in migrant workers investing their savings out of the host 
country. Jordan, for example, has no restriction on the ~a;cquisition of 
' 
real estate and this has helped Jordan in continuously acquiring large 
' amounts of foreign exchange in the form of remittances from migrant workers. 
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4. Palestinians, except in Jordan where they are treated as citi-
zens, are required by a resolution of the League of Arab States to pre-
serve and maintain their Palestinian identity. The host countries of 
Palestinian refugees are required to deny the Palestinians the citizen-
ship of the host country and for travel purposes issue them travel docu-
ments, issued by the host country but at the same time designating them 
as Palestinians. This is why Palestinians who joined the migrant labor 
force from Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq (where most of them live), 
travel on travel documents and not passports. The host countries natur-
ally refer to them as Palestinians and not as Lebanese, Egyptians, Syri-
ans, etc. 
5. When Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in June, 
1967, Israel in accordance with the "open bridges" policy allowed the 
Palestinians under its occupation to seek work in the Arab world. Israel 
did not require them to carry Israeli passports or travel documents and 
they continued to use Jordanian passports. This also included the Pal-
estinians living in the Gaza Strip, who had until June, 1967 been under 
Egyptian administration. While some of the Gaza Strip citizens use Jor-
anian passports, others use Egyptian travel documents as they did before. 
East Jerusalem, which was occupied from Jordan in 1967 was soon, there-
after, declared annexed by Israel, and its citizens were granted Israeli-
citizenship. Few if any have decided to avail themselves of this and 
the vast majority of the Palestinians of East Jerusalem preferred to con-
tinue using Jordanian passports. It should also be pointed out that all 
. ~estinians who lived in Israel prior to 1967 are considered by 
~i authorities as citizens of Israel and use Israeli passports. 
Those Palestinians are not allowed to work in the oil rich states. 
For all these reasons it is difficult to determine who are Pales-
tinians and who are Jordanians for the purposes of this study. 
7. Because of what they feel to be discriminatory treatment by 
~I) 
the Israeli~occupation forces, Palestinians on the West Bank and the 
7 
Gaza Strip have either been forced or found it more advantageous to work 
in the oil rich states. This relationship is one of the causes which 
led them to join the migrant labor force. 
8. Finally, because of political instability in some of the Arab 
States, persons associated with previous regimes and dissidents frequent-
ly either seek or are encouraged to seek work outside the home country. 
They, therefore, join the migrant labor force. 
I 
Nature of the Problem 
The discovery of oil resources and investment of oil revenues in 
the development of the economics of the ORAS has resulted in a large 
differ~nce in per capita income, and unbalanced demand for labor among 
the Arab states. In 1975 the average per capita income in the high in-
come group (ORAS) was 6370.5 dollars compared to 471.4 dollars in the 
2 
low-income group (LRAS) , while there were about 1,158, 000 Arab immi-
.. 3 
grants who were employed by the nine countries of the ORAS. 
Jordan is among the group which does not have significant natural 
resources, although she is rich in human capital. As soon as the ORAS 
started their social and economic development in the 1960's, particular~ 
ly Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates 
2world Bank Atlas (Washington, 1976) 
3 
J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration Project: 
A Summary of Provisional Findings (Durham,"l9'B), p. 13. 
8 
4 (UAE), they sought out skilled workers from neighboring Arab states, 
particularly Jordanians and Palestinians. By 1975 there were about 
266,000 Jordanian and Palestinian workers employed in ORAS. This num-
ber is approximately 23 percent of the total Arab labor immigrants into 
ORAS for the same year. 
This massive emigration of Jordanian workers abroad has been render-
ed a considerable help to the Jordanian economy in two major ways. It 
helped to find jobs and productive employment for those who cannot be 
absorbed in the domestic economy; and through the workers' remittances 
helped the Balance of Payments. In addition, remittances are a major 
source of income to many households inside Jordan. As an example, remit-
tances from workers abroad to Jordan (West Bank and East Bank) were 6,2 
million Jordanian Dinars (JD) in 1960 or about 49 percent and 13 percent 
of total exports and imports of all goods and services respectively. 5 
By 1977, remittances jumped to 143 million JD or about 47 percent of to-
tal value of exports and 26 percent of imports. 6 
However, since the end of 1973, the great increase in oil prices 
and the great jump in the oil revenues of ORAS was followed by an in-
crease in demand for labor. This new development has drained the labor 
supply in Jordan and created a shortage in certain skills and semi-skill-
.ed jobs which are necessary for Jordan's development, This also started 
for the first time, a replacement migration to Jordan from Egypt, 
4Prior to December, 1971, were known separately as Abu Dhabi and 
Trucial States. 
5 United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, Vol. I, 
Individual Country Data, 1977 (New York, 1978), pp. 610-16. 
6IMF, International Financial Statistics (Washington, 1979), p. 419. 
7 
Pakistan, and Syria. 
Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of this study is to gain an empirical under-
9 
standing of the increasing labor migration from Jordan, and another six 
Arab labor exporting countries to oil-rich Arab states (ORAS); and to 
study the consequences of workers' remittances on the Jordanian economy. 
Specifically the objectives of this thesis are to study the following 
problems. 
1. The economic determinants of labor migration between the two 
groups of LRAS and ORAS; and the study of the determinants of emigration 
or immigration of each individual state for the two groups t:"espectively. 
The econometric analysis is adopted as an analytical framework to ap-
proach this problem. 
2. The impact of workers' remittances on the main macro-economic 
variables of the Jordanian economy, such as consumption, investment, im-
ports, gross national income, and the balance of payments. 
In order to analyze this problem, a macro-model of the Keynesian 
framework for the determination of income is specified for the Jordanian 
economy. The purpose of this model is to estimate the various propensi-
ties of consumption, imports, and investment; and to calculate the mul-
tipliers for remittances, government expenditure, foreign aid, exports 
and imports. 
7J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration Project: 
Country Case Study, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Durham, 1978), p. 
1. 
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Significance of the Study 
The exploitation of oil resources and the investment in the devel-
opment of the ORAS economies, and the uneven distribution of these re-
sources among the Arab states, are evident economic factors to account 
for the present pattern and direction of labor migration in the area. 
However, unlike other studies of migration in the area, the significance 
of the presen,t study stems from the fact that it is an empirical study, 
and it has a wider scope. This study is an attempt to quantify the mag-
nitude of the economic factors which contribute to the labor movement 
between the LRAS and ORAS. Also it is, perhaps, the only empirical 
study to consider all the oil-rich Arab states as a single receiving 
group of labor migrants from seven Arab states. This study includes 
all the Arab· states, with the exception of Tunisia, Morocco, So-
malia, and Mauritania. The exclusion of these countries, however, 
is due to the lack of data on these labor migrants to ORAS. Furthermore 
the detailed empirical study of the impact of workers' remittances on 
the Jordanian economy will illuminate quantitatively the benefits of 
emigration to the national income and the Balance of Payments and will 
gauge the dimensions of alternative policy targets such as controlling 
emigration or encouraging it. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is divided into six chapters. This chapter includes an 
introduction and presents the nature of the problem along with its sig-
nificance and limitations. Chater II includes a brief historical back-
ground of Jordan and its main economic feature.s. The labor force and 
the size of migration to ORAS and their remittances relative to the 
11 
national income will also be discussed. A review of some of the theo-
retical and previous empirical studies on labor migration is presented 
in Chapter III. The methodology used in the present study is given in 
Chapters IV and V. Models of labor migration determinants from Jordan 
and other Labor-Rich Arab States (LRAS) to Oil-Rich Arab States (ORAS), 
are developed in Chapter IV. The analysis of the estimated models and 
findings are also discussed in this chapter. The consequences of work-
ers' remittances for the Jordanian economy are analyzed in Chapter V. 
A simple macroeconomic model is developed and estimated showing the 
impact of remittances on major macro variables such as consumption, im-
ports and income. Finally, the last chapter contains a summary of the 
study, conclusions, and recommendations for public policy. 
CHAPTER II 
JORDAN : ASPECTS OF LABOR MAlU<ET, 
MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES 
The occupation of the West Bank of Jordan by Israel in the war of 
June, 1967, disrupted many aspects of the unified economic life of the 
West and East Banks of Jordan. Hence, it becomes imperative in a study 
of the Jordanian economy to make a distinction whether Jordan refers 
to the East Bank, West Bank, or both East and West Banks. In this study 
the preceding distinction is made when necessary, i.e. Jordan (E/Bank, 
W/Bank, or E/W Bank). 
In this chapter there are four sections. The first section gives a 
brief historical background of Jordan. The second section presents some 
aspects of the population, labor force and employment situation prior to 
and after the June, 1967, war between Israel and the Arabs. Also, an es-
timate of the migrant workers originating from both banks of the Jordan 
River to the oil-rich Arab states is included in this section. The 
third section presents a brief analysis of workers' remittances and their 
importance relative to macro-economic varaibles such as national income. 
This is presented in two forms: the first for the East Bank and the 
second for both East and West Banks. Finally, the fourth section exam-
ines the role of workers' remittances in Jordan and their understatement 
in an international perspective. 
12 
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A Historical Background 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, formerly Transjordan, became a 
1 sovereign independent state on March 22, 1946. The part of Palestine 
remaining to the Arabs under the armistice with Israel of April 3, 1949, 
with the exception of the Gaza Strip, was on December, 1949, placed 
under Jordanian rule and formally united with Jordan on the 24th of 
April, 1950. 2 The total area of Jordan is 36,909 square miles (95,594 
square kilometers). Situated on both banks of the Jordan River, it is 
bounded in the North by Syria, in the East by Iraq, in the Southeast and 
South by Saudi Arabia, and in the West by Israel. Jordan has 12 miles 
of coastline on the Gulf of Aqabah in the Southwest, where Al-Aqabah, 
Jordan's only port, is located. The Western border divides Jerusalem 
into the Western (Israel) and Eastern (Jordan) sectors. 3 As a result of 
the Arab-Israeli War of June, 1967, Israel occupied all the territory 
on the West Bank of the Jordan River, including the Jordanian sector of 
Jerusalem. The occupied area is about 2,270 square miles (5,879 square 
kilometers), and represents about six percent of Jordan's total terri-
tory and one half of its agricultural land. 4 
Population, Labor Force and 
Workers' Migration 
A census of population in Jordan was conducted in November, 1961. 
1 
The Statesman's Yearbook, 1976-77 (London, 1976), pp. 1101-03. 
2Ibid. 
3The New Encyclopaedia Britanica, Macropaedia, X, p. 270. 
4Ibid. 
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The census enumerated a total of 1,706,226 Jordanians, of which more 
than one-quarter were displaced Palestinians as a result of the creation 
of Israel in 1948. Of the total, 805,450 persons, or 47.2 percent, were 
living in the West Bank and 980,776, or 52.8 percent, were living in 
5 the East Bank of Jordan. These population totals do not include the 
Jordanians working abroad. The census estimated the total number of 
emigrants outside of Jordan to be around 64 thousand, of which 50 thou~ 
' 6 sand, or 78 percent, originated from the West Bank. 
In mid 1975, the total population of Jordan was estimated as 2.7 
million. This figure represents a 3.3 percent annual rate of natural 
increase based on the 1961 census. Table I shows that the labor force 
annual rate of increase was 3.75 percent over the period of 1961 to 
1975, or an increase from 390 thousand labor force to 652 thousand. 
The crude participation rate (defined as total labor force divided by 
total population) was 22.9 percent for 1961 as compared to 24.1 percent 
for 1975. The employed labor had increased at an average annual rate 
of 4.1 for the same period, or from about 363,000 workers to about 
639,000. The unemployment rate dropped from a high of seven percent in 
1961 to about two percent by 1975 (see Table I). 
Population, Labor Force and Employment 
by Sector After 1967 
The occupation of the West Bank of Jordan by Israel in the war of 
5nepartment of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (Amman, 1974), 
p. 1. 
6 Issam Sakhimi, "Palestinians in the East Bank," Palestinian Af-
fairs, LXVIII/LXIX (1977), pp. 187-209. 
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TABLE I 
PRE-1967: JORDAN (WEST BANK AND EAST BANK) 
POPULATION, LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT 
. 1961-1975 
1961 1966 
Total Population 1,706,226 1,977,000 
Labor Force 390,000 458,000 
Employed 362,700 440,800 
Unemployed 27,300 17,900 
Unemployment Rate 7% 3.9% 















Sources: Figures for 1961 and 1966 are from Michael P. Mazur, ''The Eco-
nomic Development of Jordan," (unpub. Ph.D,. dissertation, MIT, 
1972}, p. 143. Figures for 1975 are from the.Internationa1 
Labor Organization, Yearbook of Labor Statistics 1978 (Geneva, 
1978}, p. 36. Unemployment rate of 2.1 percent for 1975 is 
from International Migration Project, Country Case Study, The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Durham, 1978}, p. 6. · 
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June, 1967 disrupted many aspects of the unified economic life of the 
West and East Banks of Jordan. This disruption was most serious in its 
effect on the distribution of population, manpower and employment in 
both West and East Banks of Jordan. By the end of May, 1969 there were 
an estimated 550,000 to 600,000 Arabs displaced as a result of Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank, Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip and Sinai. 
A third of these were original Palestinian refugees and their children 
(about 182 to 200 thousand) most of whom relocated in the East Bank of 
7 Jordan. Other estimates put the total displaced persons from the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip who relocated in the East Bank from June, 1967 
to the end of 1968, at around 442,000 persons, including 40,000 persons 
8 from the Gaza Strip. Those who had suffered the most as a result of the 
war had emigrated during the months immediately following June, 1967. 
Included in this group were many refugees of 1948 and natives of the 
West Bank including governmental employees, large numbers of professional 
people, students, and families dependent on remittances from family mem-
9 hers working abroad. By the end of 1967, the West Bank had a total pop-
ulation of about 586,000. This figures excludes the 65.000 Arab popula-
tion of East Jerusalem which had been unilaterally annexed by Israel and 
placed under full Israeli sovereignty. 
Until the beginning of 1969, the population of the West Bank declin-
ed to a low of 584 thousand as a result of emigration. Since then, -
"7Europa Publications, The Middle East snd North Africa 1969/70 ~ 
(London, 1970), p. 93. 
8 Gouncil for the Advancement of Arab British Understanding, A Just 
Settlement of the Refugee Problem: Records of a Seminar on the Pales-
tine Refugee Problem (London, 1973), p. 20. 
9vivian A. Bull, The West Bank- Is It Viable? (Lexington, 1975), 
p. 112. 
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however, the population has increased. By the end of 1975, the total 
population of the West Bank reached 665,100. This gives an annual rate 
of population increase over the eight years of about 1.6 percent, from 
the end of 1967 to the end of 1975. This population growth rate is less 
than the natural increase of 3.3 percent experieinced in Jordan for the 
period between 1961 to 1975. This low rate of population increase sug-v 
gests a continued emigration by the end of 1975 from the West Bank. 
Table II shows the population, labor force and employment by sector 
for the West Bank and East Bank separately for 1975. Two observations 
are appropriate with regard to the figures in this table. The first is 
the fact that the figures do not include the Jordanians from the East or 
West Bank who are working abroad. The second, is the employment of the 
labor force by sector for the East-West Bank is not comparable, because 
about 40,000 workers of the West Bank, or about 30 percent of the total, 
were working in the Israeli economy. The total labor force for the 
East Bank of Jordan was 380,000 out of total population of 1.9 million, 
representing a crude participation rate of 20 percent. The total employ-
ed workers in the West Bank was 133,900 out of a total population of 
665,100 or approximately a participation rate for the West Bank of 20.1 
percent, roughly the same as for the East Bank. These low labor-force 
participation rates can be attributed to a number of factors including 
the low age profile of the population, the high rate of school enroll-
ment, the low female participation in the labor force, and to a large 
young emigrant number of workers in the labor-rich Arab states. 
The largest share of East Bank employment, 63 percent, is in ser-
vices. When compared to the West Bank's share of 42 percent this ap-
pears very high. This large difference could perhaps be explained by 
TABLE II 
POST 1967: EAST BANK AND WEST BANK OF 
JORDAN, POPULATION, LABOR FORCE AND 




Thousands Percentage Thousands Percentage 
Population 1900 665.1 
Total Employed 380 133.9 
Crude Participation Rate 20 20.1 
Employment by Sector: 
Agriculture 68 18 44.2 33 
Manufacturing 72 19 33.5 25 
Services 240 63 56.3 42 
Sources: Figures for the East Bank of Jordan are derived from the Na-
tional Planning Council, jordan Five Year Plan 1976-1980 
(Amman, 1976), p. 25. Figures for the West Bank are from the 
Statistical Abstract of Israel 1978 as derived by Rose Musleh, 
"Industry in the West Bank for 1967-1979, Firms, Labor and 
Wages," Palestinian Affairs, XCIX (1980), pp. 3-32. 
• 
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the fact that the total number of workers of the East Bank includes the 
public sector and the armed forces, while the West Bank does not have a 
large public sector or any army. The remaining percentage of the total 
labor force employed for the East Bank amounts to 18 percent in agricul-
ture and 19 percent in manufacturing. The equivalent figures for the 
West Bank are 33 percent in agriculture and 25 percent for manufacturing. 
Jordanian (Including Palestinian) 
Workers in the Oil Rich Arab 
States 
The estimated number of Jordanians from the West Bank, and East 
Bank found to be working abroad in the 1961 census was approximately 
64,000. The majority of those abroad were in the oil-rich Arab states 
and in particular Kuwait, where about 50 percent of all Jordanians abroad 
were located in 1961. 10 
By the end of 1975, the total number of Jordanians and Palestinians 
had increased to about 286,000, distributed among nine countries of the 
oil-rich Arab states. As Table III shows about 66 percent of the total 
were working in Saudi Arabia, 18 percent in Kuwait, 10.9 percent in both 
Libya and the United Arab Emirates, and about 5.1 percent in Iraq, Al-
geria, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain. 
The published figures for Jordanians and Palestinians in the ORAS 
do not make a distinction between Jordanians and Palestinians. There-
fore, it is difficult to know precisely the proportion of those workers 
who come from the West and East Banks of Jordan, those who carry the 
10 
M. P. Mazur, "The Economic Development of Jordan," (Unpub. Ph.D. 












JORDANIAN (INCLUDING PALESTINIAN) WORKERS 
ABROAD BY COUNTRY - 1975 
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Sources: J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration Pro-
ject: A Summary of Provisional Findings (Durham, 1978), p. 
13; Zafer H. Ecevit, International Labor Migration in the 
Middle East and North Africa:paper presented to the Rocke-
feller Conference on International Migration (Bellagio, Italy, 
1979), p. 5. 
Jordanian nationality, and the Palestinians who mainly come from the 
Gaza Strip, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. An estimation of the Jordan-
ians from the East Bank only was about 150,000 in 1975. This estima-
tion suggests that the rest (or the 116,000) are considered to come 
from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. 
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The knowledge of the total number of Jordanian workers abroad and 
their characteristics, differentiated into Jordanians (including Pales-
tinians, from West Bank and East Bank) and Palestinians from other 
areas, is important for Jordan's manpower and development planning pol-
icies. For example, Jordanians abroad consider the West or East Bank 
the home they return to once their jobs are terminated, they resign 
or they are retired. In fact, most of them leave their families and 
relatives behind. This presents to the manpower planning authorities 
in Jordan the problem of finding productive jobs for returning workers. 
To the economic development planners, workers' remittances must be 
channeled in such a manner as to increase the productive capacity of the 
country and lessen the negative impacts such as land price speculation. 
For the above reasons, an attempt is made to estimate the total number 
of Jordanian workers abroad, those who come from the West Bank and East 
Bank, utilizing the available data on the total number of all "Jordan-
ians·and Palestinians" in the ORAS. Two simplifying assumptions are 
made. The first is that all workers originate from the communities of 
Jordanians and Palestinians residing in the East Bank and West Bank of 
Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and from the Palestinians in Egypt, Syria and 
Lebanon. The second assumption is that the average propen13ity to migrate 
is the same for all the Jordanian and Palestinian communities in the 
areas of residency. The average propensity to migrate is defined as the 
22 
total labor migrants of all Jordanians and Palestinians in the ORAS in 
1975, divided by the total population of all Jordanians and Palestini-
ans who were living in the West Bank, East Bank, Gaza Strip, Egypt, 
Syria and Lebanon, in 1975. Using the two assumptions, the distribu-
tion of the total labor migrants by origin of residency could be ascer-
tained by multiplying the population by the average propensity. These 
results are shown in Table IV. This table shows that the West Bank and 
the East Bank of Jordan account for 75 percent of the total Jordanians 
and Palestinians in the ORAS, or 198,400 workers, out of which about 
143,000 workers or 54 percent originate from the East Bank, and about 
55,000 workers or 21 percent originate from the West Bank. Gaza Strip 
labor migrants in the ORAS account for 12 percent or about 33,000 work-
ers and about 34,000 workers or 13 percent originate from Palestinian 
communities in Egypt, Syria.and Lebanon. 
The above distribution indicates that Jordan's West Bank and East 
Bank) workers in the ORAS (about 198,000) are approximately 38.2 percent 
of the total employed work force inside both the West Bank and the East 
Bank of Jordan for 1975. This could mean that for every 100 jobs that 
were available inside, there were about 38 additional jobs available 
in the ORAS. In the same manner, the ratio of Jordan's labor migrants 
in the ORAS to the total Jordanian employed workers (inside and outside) 
is calculated to be approximately 28 percent. This could mean that for 
every 100 jobs available inside Jordan (west and East Banks) and outside 
Jordan (in the ORAS), approximately 28 jobs were available outside or 






JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS: POPULATION BY 
AREA OF RESIDENCY AND MIGRANT WORKERS IN 
THE ORAS BY PLACE OF ORIGIN IN 
THOUSANDS FOR 1975 
Migrant Workers 
Population Percentage in ORAS 
1900 54 143.33 
730 21 55.07 







and Lebanon 463 13 34~93 13 
TOTAL 3526 100 266.00 100 
The above distribution of Palestinians and Jordanians was based on 
the assumption that the average propensity to migrate is the same for 
all communities in the place of origin; the violation of this assump-
tion would certainly give different distributions. For example, if 
the average propensity to migrate of the West Bankers is higher than 
the East Bankers, then the above distribution would underestimate the 
number of migrants in the former and overestimate the number of migrants 
of the latter. 
Sources: The population of the East Bank is derived from the National 
Planning Council, Five Year Plan for Economic and Social De-
velopment, 1976-1980 (Amman, 1976), p. 25. T.he West Bank 
includes the 65,000 population figure of the Arab Sector of 
Jerusalem, as it was in 1967 according to Rose Musleh, "Indus-
try in the West Bank for 1967-1979, Firms, Labor, and Wages," 
Palestinian Affairs, XCIX (1980), p. 5. Population of the 
Palestinians in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon is from Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives (London, 1977), p. 28385. Total migrant 
workers in the oil-rich Arab states are derived from J. S. 
Birks and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration Project: 
A Summary of Provisional Findings (Durham, 1978), p. 13 and 
Zafer H. Ecevit, International Labor Migration,in the Middle 
East and North Africa paper presented to the Ropkefeller 
Conference on International Migration (Bellagi,o, Italy, 1979), 
p. 5. r 
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Workers' Remittances and Their Significance 
to Jordan's National Income and the 
Balance of Payments 
This section analyzes the growth of workers' r~ittances and their 
significance to Jordan's national income and the gross domestic product. 
Furthermore, the role of remittances and the Balance of Payments deficit 
is discussed and compared to the role of foreign aid in this regard. 
The method used in this section to analyze the significance and 
role of workers' remittances is based on two sets of data. The first is 
based on unified national accounts estimates for both East Bank and West 
Bank. The second is based on estimates of national accounts for theEast: 
Bank only. Both sets of data are in current Jordanian Dinars. 
The method is not without limitations. At the outset, since remit-
tances are the same, the analysis based on the unified estimates for both 
banks of Jordan will be an underestimate of the significance and role of 
remittances, while the analysis based on the estimates for the East Bank 
only, will be an overestimate of such a role. Other important limitations 
of this analysis include "the annexation of the Arab sector of East Jerusa-
lem into Israel," and the "open bridges" policy between the West Bank and 
East Bank (the existing arrangement of allowing traffic and movement of 
people between the occupied West Bank and the East Bank). 
Since 1967, economic data of East Jerusalem, the West Bank's larg-
est city and its vital tourist and commercial center have been included 
11 
in Israeli economic statistics. Hence, it is neither included in data 
for the West Bank nor separately identifiable. Therefore,· estimates 
11 Brian Van Arkadie, Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip Economies Since 1967 (New York, 1977), pp. 32-34. 
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of national accounts for the West Bank which excludes East Jerusalem, 
are at best an underestimate of the national accounts and trade of the 
West Bank. 
The "open bridges" policy has had an important consequence in fa-
cilitating the maintenance of a complex network of monetary and fiscal 
connections between the West and East Banks. For example, the Jordanian 
dinar has continued to circulate alongside the Israeli pound as a legal 
currency on the West Bank. Furthermore, the Jordanian government has 
continued to pay many of its former officials on the West Bank and has 
12 periodically made loans available to West Bank municipalities. More 
importantly, the flow of people between East and West Banks make it dif-
ficult to know precisely the way the remittances are diffused between 
the West and East Bank economies. 
In spite of the above limitations, the analysis of workers' remit-
tances and their role and significance on the Jordanian economy (East 
Bank) only, and on both Banks is presented below. 
Workers' Remittances and Their 
Significance to Jordan's (East 
Bank) National Income and 
Balance of Pa~ents 
Table V shows the workers' remittanances, national income, and 
other important elements of the National Income components of the East 
Bank of Jordan for the period 1967 to 1977. In this table remittances 
were only 11.3 million Jordanian dinars (JD) in 1967, and by the end of 
12Ibid., p. 34. 
.. 
TABLE V 
WORKERS ' REMITTANCES AND NATIONAL INCOME (EAST 
BANK) IN MILLIONS OF JORDA..lll"IAN DINARS AND IN 
PERCENTAGES FOR 1967-1977 
Remittances as a Percenta~e of: 
Foreign Foreign 
Year Remittances GNP GDP Exports Imports Aid GNP GDP Exports Imports Aid 
1967 11.3 142.5 131.2 20.8 59.8 50.1 50.1 8.6 54.2 18.9 22.5 
1968 10.3 166.4 156.1 18.9 73.6 62.1 62.1 6.6 54.5 14.0 16.6 
1969 14.0 197.4 183.4 20.6 97.7 43.8 43.8 7.6 68.0 14.3 32.0 
1970 12.6 187.0 174.4 17.6 76.8 37.1 37.1 7.2 71.6 16.4 34.0 
1971 13.2 199.4 186.2 17.8 88.9 36.2 36.2 7.1 74.2 14.8 36.5 
1972 13.8 221.0 207.2 37.0 117.8 53.5 53.5 6.7 37.3 11.7 25.8 
1973 23.2 241.5 218.3 52.4 136.4 59.5 59.5 10.6 44.2 17.0 39.0 
1974 32.0 279.3 247.3 80.3 196.1 76.4 76.4 12.9 39.8 16.3 41.8 
1975 63.9 342.5 278.6 118.9 301.1 140.0 140.0 22.9 53.7 21.2 45.6 
1976 140.8 528.7 387~9 192.0 435.7 127.0 127.0 36.2 73.3 32.3 110.8 
1977 145.9 617.9 472.0 242.0 546.2 166.0 166.0 30.9 60.2 26.7 87.9 
TOTAL 481. 3123.6 2642.6 818.3 2130.1 851.7 15.3 18.2 58.8 22.6 56.5 
Annual 
Growth 15.8$ 13.65% 24.76% 12.74% Rate 29.2% 
Export and import figures include both goods and services. 




1977, the remittances had grown to be 145.9 million (JD), This increase 
in remittances level represents an annual growth rate of about 29.2 per-
cent over the ten year span since 1967. This high growth rate is above 
the annual growth rate of gross national product by about 13 percent, 
and more than double the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) fo~ 
the same period. 
However, a close examination of the level of workers' remittances 
shows that this high growth rate is a result of the large increases in 
these remittances since 1973. As an example, the annual growth rate of 
the remittances had only been 4.1 percent over the period of 1967 to 
1972. In 1973, remittances increased almost 100 percent over the 1967 
level. In 1977 the increases were over six ~imes their level in 1973. 
Several factors could have contributed to this high growth rate of 
workers' remittances. Important among these are the large increases 
in the number of Jordanian emigrants since 1973, and their propensity to 
save; also the higher incomes the new (since 1971) and old (pre 1973) 
Jordanian workers enjoyed in the ORAS as a result of wage and salary in-
creases since 1973 due to inflation. 13 
The increases in the oil prices in 1973 and the higher oil revenues 
accruing to ORAS led to an accelerated pace of development in these 
countries, and attracted more labor from Jordan. A high proportion of 
the new migrant workers were unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers 
who traveled and left their families behind in Jordan, and remitted or 
saved a high proportion of their earnings. 
Other important aspects of the significance of workers' remittances 
13 International Migration Project, Country Case Study: The Hashe-
mite Kingdom of Jordan (Durham, 1978), p. 47. 
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is their role in bridging the deficit gap in the Balance of Payments. 
Table V shows that workers' remittances averaged about 23 percent of 
imports over the period of 1967 to 1977. This means that on the average, 
a value of one million (JD) of imports of workers' remittances could 
cover 23 percent of such value. 
However, an alternative approach to the significance of the 
workers' remittances in the Jordanian Balance of Payments (East Bank), 
and its importance relative to the country's foreign aid receipts, would 
be to relate these remittances to the "import surplus" (deficit) i.e., 
the excess of imports over exports. 
The results appear in Table VI. The trend of workers' remittances 
appear to have increased significantly in paying for the import surplus 
(deficit) ~ince 1967). In 1977 the remittances were about 48 percent 
of the "import surplus" while the foreign aid was about 55 percent. 
The average however, over the 11 year period shows that foreign aid is 
more significant than workers' remittances in paying for the import sur-
plus. This does not, however, obscure the fact that workers' remittances 
are direct income transfers to the household and private sector in the 
economy, while the foreign aid is a direct budget assistance for govern-
ment and the public sector. A further analysis of the impact of each 
on the economy will be made in Chapter V. 
Workers' Remittances and Their 
Significance to Jordan (East 
Bank and West Bank) National 
Income 
















WORKERS' REMITTANCES AND FOREIGN AID AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF IMPORT SURPLUS (DEFICITS) 














































"The figures of "import surplus" and the calculations of remittan-












WORKERS' REMITTANCES, NATIONAL INCOME AND GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR JORDAN (EAST BANK AND 
WEST BANK) IN MILLIONS (JD) AND IN 
PERCENTAGE 1960 - 1977 
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GDP Income GDP 
98.29 7.3 7.5 
167.61 7.2 7.4 
209.86 5.9 6.0 
444.30 12.8 14.3 
663.10 18.3 22.0 
11.8 
Sources: United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts (New York, 1960-
1977); and United States AID, Regional Cooperation in the 
Middle East (Washington, 1979). 
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was 19.2 percent for the period 1960 to 1977. This rate is higher than 
the realized growth rate of national income or gross domestic product, 
which were 12.9 percent and 11.8 percent respectively. This table shows 
also the importance of workers' remittances as they had increased as a 
proportion of the national income and gross national product. In the 
national income, remittances were only 7.3 percent in 1960. By 1977 
they reached 18.3 percent of the national income. Comparable percen-
tages in the gross domestic product are 7.5 percent and 22 percent. 
The above analysis shows clearly the increasing importance of work-
ers' remittances as a source of income for the Jordanians. 
Workers' Remittances of Jordan: An 
14 International Perspective 
How special a case is Jordan? Are there other countries for whom 
the export of human resources is a major source of foreign exchange? If 
so, have they broad characteristics in common? The approach to these 
questions was to calculate from the IMF Balance of Payrnent.s Yearbooks 
workers' remittances as percentages of exports for all LDCs covered 
therein, and for more advanced countries, such as Italy and Spain, who 
are major exporters of human resources. The 70 such countries for which 
both types of information were reported were then grouped by intervals 
of five percentage points, as follows: 
Category I 0 - 5% 30 countries 
Category II 6 - 10% 12 countries 
Category III 11, - 15% 6 countries 
.) 
14This section is quoted from a paper by Dr. John C. Shearer, Chair-
man of my thesis committee. "The Role of Remittances in the 'Brain 
Drain' Controversy," presented at the Midwestern Economic ·Assoc.iation 
Meeting, Chicago {April, 1978), pp. 1-14. 
32 
Category IV 16% and over 22 countries 
In order to qualify for a category a given country must have had 
at least one year at or above that category's minimum percentage during 
the ten-year period utilized (1967-1976). Sixteen of the 30 countries 
in Category I are Western Hemisphere countries while seven African coun-
tries comprise the next largest regional representation. Western Hem-
!sphere countries account for half of the 12 countries in Category II, 
the other half being equally divided between African and Asian-Oceanic 
nations. Half of the six countries in Category III are Asian. The 
countries in Categories II and III present striking contrasts. Category 
II includes small and poor Benin (formerly Dahomey) with a 1974 popula-
tion of three million and a GNP per capita of $120, and large and not so 
poor Mexico (58 million and $1,090). Category III ranges from small and 
poor Chad (four million and $100) to huge and not quite so poor India 
(almost 600 million and $140). 15 
This section is most concerned with the 22 countries in Category 
IV. A close examination of the IMF data for comparability necessitated 
dropping eight countries: Cyprus, Korea, Lebanon, Mali, Malta, Portu-
gal, Vietnam and Western Samoa. By the criteria used, the remaining 
14 countries are high in percentages of workers' remittances to exports. 
These percentages for the period 1967-1976 are presented in Table VIII 
together with 1974 data on each country's population and per capita GNP. 
An additional country, Mexico, which does not officially qualify for 
Caregory IV, is included for reasons which will be developed later in 
this section. 
15 World Bank Atlas (Washington, 1976). 
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WORKERS' REMITTANCES AS PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS 
(1967-1976) AND POPULATION AND GNP PER 
CAPITA (1974) FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Year 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Average 
59 29 47 45 43 44 61 49 102 199 67.8 
25 20 25 23 32 25 20 8 22.3 
4 3 3 12 11 16 8.2 
10 9 12 13 21 21 26 19 34 18.3 
7 9 13 16 21 20 14.3 
53 46 39 39 48 30 42.5 
49 50 51 54 73 69 60 37 39 36 51.8 
23 19 20 19 18 15 17 12 17.9 
18 21 26 46 70 87 90 93 94 60.6 
7 10 14 26 44 45 49 42 32 28 29.7 
31 39 42 35 88 26 29 32 40.3 
8 13 18 13 9 21 16 18 27 15.9 
17 17 15 14 9 8 13.3 
41 57 57 73 85 73 80 66.6 
9 9 7 7 6 6 7.3 



















(1970, 1976). The per-
centage of remittances refers to exported goods only, i.e. excluding services. World Bank, World 




A perusal of Table VIII, and especially of the country averages over 
the ten-year period, is revealing. It shows that Jordan, despite its 
phenomenal surge over the last few years, is not so exceptional as its 
recent extremely high percentages would suggest. Jordan's 68 percent 
average only slightly exceeds that of Upper Volta (67 percent), which is 
followed closely by Turkey (61 percent) and thereafter by Greece (52 per-
percent, Yemen (43 percent), and Haiti (40 percent). Neither these 
high-average countries nor the others of Category IV are limited to the 
very small and/or very poor. For these countries, the lack of corres-
pondence between their averages and their characteristics is more easily 
shown by ranking them, in Table IX, by average percentage of remittances 
to exports, and designating them, in accordance with natural breaks in 
the data as "small" (less than ten million population) or ''larger" and 
as "poor" (less than $1,000 GNP per capita) or "less poor." 
Despite considerable diversity, "poor" is clearly (and not surprising-
ly) more descriptive of the 14 countries (ten of them) than is any of 
the three other designations. Thus, we have for an otherwise diverse 
group of countries evidence of a recent history of very substantial 
foreign exchange earnings through the export of manpower. For four coun-
tries the ten-year average of officially reported workers' remittances 
exceeded half the value of exports. For two of these countries, Jordan 
and Upper Volta, officially reported remittances were approximately two-
thirds of exports. In each year since 1972, Turkey's officially report-
ed remittances closely approached the total value of exports, and in 

















CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES RANKED 



















































The Understatement of Workers' 
Remittances 
For most or all countries the actual amounts of workers' remittances 
are considerably greater than those reported officially. Jordan is 
probably typical in basing its official figures on Central Bank clear-
ings of private checks from abroad. It does not add an adjustment for 
estimated remittances which do not pass through its hands. Although no 
estimate is available, it is widely known that unreported remittances 
are quite large in Jordan, as elsewhere. Despite the absence of foreign 
exchange restrictions in Jordan, the large unidentified flows reflect 
both the personal convenience of carrying cash on visits home (or send-
I 
ing it with relatives or friends) and the preferences of a considerable 
portion of migrant workers (especially those at lower educational levels) 
never to use the banking system. In countries where exchange contiOls 
exist, the personal conveyance (in this case, smuggling) of cash assumes 
considerably greater prominence. 
Some spotty evidence tends to corroborate the vast official under-
statement of workers' remittances. As shown at the bottom of Table VIII 
the officially reported remittances for Mexico are moderate percentages 
of exports, averaging 7.3 percent over recent years. The IMF reports 
these remittances for 1971 through 1974 as 132, 139, 139 and 195 millions 
16 of dollars, respectively. These official figures could be demonstrat-
ed to represent only a small portion. of the actual remittanc:es. Sup-
pose that all the officially reported remittances came only from "ille-
gals" in the United States (with none from other countries, from legal 
16 
International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, XXVII 
(Mexico, 1976). 
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immigrants, "Green Carders," etc.). Applying the published estimates 
by the u.s. Immigration and Naturalization Service17 of between two and 
twelve million illegal aliens (predominantly Mexican and most of recent 
origin) leads to interesting results. Assuming that half of the two 
million (low estimate) were working, their average individual remit-
tances would have been a paltry $195 in 1974. If half of the high esti-
mate of 12 million illegals were working, their 1974 remittances would 
have averaged a miniscule $32.50. Suffice it to suggest that actual re-
mittances to Mexico must be a considerable multiple of those reported. 
Although special circumstances may make the difference between reported 
and actual remittances greater for Mexico than for most other countries, 
aspects common to most high remittance countries, especially poverty, 
suggest that actual remittances are universally and considerably greater 
than those reported. 
The evidence in this section shows that for Jordan and other coun-
tries, especially certain poor ones, the export of their human resources 
constitutes a major, and sometimes the dominant, source of reported "ex-
port" earnings through remittances. The actual remittances considerably 
exceed those reported and, for a number of countries, constitute one of 
their major economic realities, the effects of which are pervasive. 
Evaluation of the impact of workers' remittances on the home economy 
would .understate their effect if it is based only on the official data. 
The more correct evaluation would take the actual remittances (report-
ed and unreported) into consideration. 
17 
"Poor Mexicans Flood Into u.s. to .seek Jobs, Deluging Border Pa-
trol," The Wall Street Journal (September 9, 1977), p. 1. 
CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND LABOR MIGRATION: 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first sec-
tion reviews the theoretical foundation of the economics of labor mi-
gration and considers a number of models specified in the literature 
to analyze the determinants of labor migration. The second section re-
views a number of empirical studies of dete~inants of migration. Fi-
nally, the third section reviews the theoretical and empirical conse-
quences of labor migration. 
Theoretical Basis of Labor Migration 
The theoretical analysis of labor migration is based mostly on the 
neoclassical general equilibrium theory of factor mobility. This 
theory predicts that in a situation characterized by international 
differentials in real wages, labor will migrate from the low wage to 
the high wage region, until real wages are equalized. 
1 The above theory has been substantiated by Mundell, who shows 
that in a situation where factor mobility is perfect, commodity mobility 
1 Robert A. Mundell, "International Trade and 
American Economic Review, XLVII (1957), quotation 
son, Regional Economics: Location, Theory, Urban 
gional Change (New York, 1972), p. 287. • 
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Factor Mobility," 




is imperfect, and inequality exists in factor prices between countries, 
then factors would move in such a way as to equalize factor prices. 
Restrictive assumptions are necessary to arrive at such a conclusion. 
Important among these are homogenous factors, constant return to scale, 
zero migration cost, full employment and perfect factor mobility. 
The theoretical implication of the classical view is the emphasis 
it gives to relative real wages as the adjusting factor in bringing an 
equilibrium in the labor market between countries, or within a region, 
and, accordingly, real wage is considered a central determinant factor 
of labor migration. 
The above framework, however, is not the only one. Another view 
recognizes the shortcomings of the traditional restrictive assumptions 
such as the zero migration cost, and the perfect mobility. This view 
explains labor migration among regions as a result of a disequilibrium 
process, rather than a marginal adjustment. In this respect labor mi-
gration can be explained as a response to disequilibrium in the labor 
2 
market. This alternative view postulates the demand and supply func-
tions of labor as expected by the potential migrants. Migration between 
any two regions is then v~ewed as determined by the expected excess de-
3 mand for labor gap between the two regions. This view allows for 
social and economic factors, barriers to migration which slow down the 
response to the relative expected excess demand gap. 
2 
Pan A. Yotopoulos and Jeffrey B. Nugent, Economics of Development: 
Empirical Investigation (New York, 1976), pp. 219-220. 
3 
Ruth A. Fabricant, "An Expectational Model of Migration," Journal 
of Regional Science, X (1970), pp. 13-24. 
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Models of Migration 
It is possible to classify economic models of migration into three 
groups: on the basis of functional specifications, of theoretical hy-
potheses, or human capital/labor market oriented models. 
Functional Specifications. Despite the variety in models suggest-
ed in the literature, they can be classified into three main specifica-
tiona: 
4 
ad-hoc models, gravity models, and Markov chain models. 
The ad-hoc models usually have the migration flow (total numbers), 
or rates (total numbers divided by respective population) as a dependent 
variable to be determined by a set of independent or explanatory varia-
bles. On the basis of the economic theory, migration into a region may 
be expected to be a function of the regional wage rate, or per capita 
income, and employment rate. Ad-hoc models are specified in linear re-
gression form. 
The gravity models, unlike the ad-hoc models, use log linear speci-
fications, and are based on an analogy with physical phenomena. The 
population of a region or a country is considered a mass concentrated at 
its center. Migration between two regions or places is a function of 
5 the gravitational attraction of the two places. This model can be 
utilized to include more explanatoryvariables to estimate "push" and 
"pull" factors important to each place. The "push" factors, are factors 
4National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Regional Papets 
II (Cambridge, 1973),~pp. 51-107. 
5 Ibid. , p. 58. 
.. 
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that move migrants away from certain regions. The "pull" factors are 
factors that attract migrants to some places. 
Finally, Markov chain models, unlike the above two specifications, 
are not fitted by a least square estimation. Instead, the observed 
pattern of migration during one time period is summarized in a set of 
fixed coefficients (migrants divided by origin's population, this is 
called the transition matrix or matrix of distribution). The fixed co-
efficients are also assumed to hold in the future. In Markov chain-
type model, ortly the size of the population of the region of origin is 
allowed to affect the level of migration. In its restrictive assump-
tion of fixed coefficients, it is analogous to input-output analysis. 
This type of model is utilized to generate forecasts of future migra-
tion or population in conjunction with models of births, deaths, and 
interregional migration. 6 The basic advantage of the Markov chain mod-
el is that it establishes a set of coefficients that may be multiplied 
into regional populations to form estimates of the level of interregicn-
al or international migration. 
Theoretical Hypotheses. The classification of theoretical hypo-
theses according to Richardson, falls into two broad classes, deter-
minis tic or probabilistic hypotheses. T·!ith regard to deterministic mod-
els, the rate of migration is determined by objective economic conditions, 
such as wage difference between regions, distance traveled or the 
6 Tbid., p. 56. 
7 Harry W. Richardson, p. 298. 
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availability of information to the potential migrant. In .this type of 
·-
hypothesis, the focus is on the assumption that individua.~s act as rational 
economic beings. This also implies that migration will occur once the 
economic conditions, such as earning differentials, are f~vorable. No 
allowance is made for differences among the potential migrants with 
respect to age, sex, or skill. 
Probabilistic models, unlike the above type, allow individuals to 
have attachment to a region inertia, and the exercise of free choice. 
Thus, the decision to move will depend upon the individual and it will 
not be the same for each. For instance, although substantial earning 
differentials may induce some migration, non-economic factors have also 
to be taken into consideration to the extent that they may offset large 
income gains. In summary, the probabilistic hypothesis postulates that 
the decision to move will depend upon earning gain from movement, the 
direct cost, and the disutility of moving. Evidently, the earning dif-
ferentials required to induce migration will vary among individuals pri-
marily because the disutility of moving is much greater for some people 
than for others. 
The significance of the above classification is twofold. One is 
the distinction between capacity or incentive to migrate, and actual 
migration. In this sense, the deterministic models equate both the 
incentive to migrate with migration, while the probabilistic models do 
not. Rather, the later models allow migration to be interpreted as a 
propensity to move instead of movement. This interpretation makes it 
possible to take the individual time preference and utility into consid-
eration. Second, the above classification makes it possible to explain 
the observed migration pattern and selectivity, such as the higher 
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proportion of highly skilled or young among the migrants. It also helps 
to predict the actual level of migration from an analysis of the age, 
8 
sex, or occupational distribution of the sending population. 
Human Capital/Labor Market Oriented Models. Under this classifi-
cation migration occurs either because it is viewed as investment in 
human capital or as a response to the labor market mechanism. 
Human capital oriented models, often cited in literature of migra-
tion are (a) The simple human capital of migration. Migration in this 
model is decided by the individual on the basis of a capitalized value 
of the differential of the net receiving-sending regions earnings 
9 stream. (b) Another model which is attributed to Todaro emphasizes 
the crucial role played by employment expectation in the decision to 
migrate. 10 This model is termed "The Probability of Employment Model." 
It is a modification of the human capital model, and it considers the 
decision to migrate depends on the expected, rather than the actual 
receiving-sending regions real wage differentials; and the expected dif-
ferential is determined by the interaction of two variables. The actual 
wage differential and the probability of obtaining employment in the 
receiving region. 
The labor market oriented models could be grouped under the fol-
11 lowing. (A) Lewis-Ranis-Fe models, which are based on the dualistic 
8 Ibid., pp. 301-04. 
9 Pan A. Yotopoulos and Jeffrey B. Nugent, p. 26. 
10 Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World 
(London, 1977), p. 194. 
11 Pan A. Yotopoulos, pp. 230-35. 
/ .... 
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nature of the economy. A view of how the labor markets work under-
lies this approach. It is based on the assumption that labor supply is 
infinitely elastic or very elastic, and hence, the marginal laborer mi-
grates with either zero marginal product if he is in the surplus pool, 
or above zero marginal product if he is employed. In this model, labor 
migrates from the agricultural (traditional) sector), to the industria-
lized (modern) sector. (b) Sequential Job Search Models under uncer-
tainty. Alchain, Phelps, and David utilize explicitly the job search 
process and unemployment in these models. According to this view, mi-
gration involves three steps, one has to quit and join the unemployed, 
then to engage in job search, and finally to accept a suitable job offer. 
This type of model emphasizes the supply side of the labor market in ex-
plaining migration, and also allows for income differentials to persist 
or even increase despite migration. (c) Job-Competition Models. Thu-
row and Lucas challenge the neoclassical models of wage-competition, 
where the market mechanism would ultimately through wage adjustment, 
bring supply and demand into equilibrium. In their alternative view, it 
is not the marginal productivity of the worker that determines the wage 
rate the job carries, but it is the marginal productivity of the job 
that will determine the wage rate. The job-competition model emphasizes 
the demand side of the labor market; this is in contrast to the sequen-
tial job-search models. The demand for job skills creates the supply 
of job skills. Furthermore, these types of models imply that the demand 
for labor determines which skills will be taught or require training in 
the future. 
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Determinants of Labor Migration: 
An Empirical Finding 
Introduction 
Studies on labor migration are varied in kind and scope. However, 
two main kinds of migration can be distinguished: internal migration with-
in a country, which occurs between rural to urban center, and international 
migration between countries, such as between less developed countries 
and developed countries. The scope of studies of migration covers the 
causes or determinants of migration and the impact or consequences of mi-
gration for the sending-receiving region and their populations. 
The scope of studies, however, is applied to both types of migra-
tion without a significant distinction. Thus, variables which determine 
migration within a country could be as well the same factors which are 
taken as determinants of migration between countries. For example, in-
come or wage differential as a factor or cause of migration, could be 
used to explain rural-urban migration as well as between low income 
countries and high income countries. Similar contention could be made 
with regard to the analysis of the consequences of migration. A "brain 
drain" problem, as an example, could be encountered in both types of 
migration, internal or international migration. 
Based upon the preceding contentions below are some of the general 
findings of a selected number of empirical studies of determinants of 
migration are reviewed. The review contains both types of migration. 
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Empirical Findings 
General Findings. In a survey on internal migration in the United 
States, Greenwood examines the findings of a selected number of empirical 
12 
works on determinants of internal migration. The following are some of 
the important conclusions regarding the relationship between migration 
as the dependent variable to be explained, and distance, income, employ-
ment status and characteristics of migrants as independent variables, or 
determinants to explain migration. 
(1) Gross migration declines with increased availability of infor-
mation. (2) Migration does occur from low to high income regions. (3) 
There exists a significant difference in the migratory behavior of white 
and non-whites. This could be as a result of whites having generally 
higher human capital stock as well as better job contacts than the non-
whites. (4) A shortcoming of the massive literature on determinants of 
labor migration is the lack of explicit policy variables. Though it is 
useful to know the magnitude of the factors which influence migration, 
it is also true that there will be little use of the research results, 
if these factors or variables cannot be amenable to policy influences. 
For this reason, perhaps the simultaneous equation model approach to mi-
gration is more adequate to analyze the impact of policy decisions on 
migration. 13 
12Michael J. Greenwood, "Research on Internal Migration in the 
United States: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, XIII (1975), 
pp. 397-433. 
13Ibid., p. 412. 
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Another evidence on determinants of internal migration is report-
14 
ed in literature for studies carried out on less developed countries. 
Econometric studies confirm that people tend to move for economic gains 
from poorer areas to wealthier areas. Studies show that when wage or 
per capita income differentials are included as explanatory variables 
in the migration function, the rate of migration increases with the size 
of the differentials. When average per capita income or wage level of 
the two areas are included separately in the function, migration is 
found to be positively related to the wage or income level of the desti-
nation area and, negatively related to the wage or income in the origin 
area. Furthermore, the findings suggest that when the expected wage 
(i.e., the wage rate adjusted for the probability of being employed) is 
used, it is found to be a better explanatory variable than the wage 
rate. 
Contacts and distance also affect a migrant choice of location. 
Contacts are generally found to have a positive effect on migration to 
a specific area. Contacts are usually measured by the presence of rela-
tives or by stock of persons who had migrated from the home location. 
Distance is generally found to be negatively related to the rate of 
migration. 
Specific Findings. In an econometric study of the determinants 
of internal migration of labor in Egypt, Greenwood considers the 
14 Lorene Y. L. Yap, "The Attraction of Cities: A Review of the 
Migration Literature," Journal of Development Economics, IV (1977), 
pp. 239-64. 
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migration rate as the number of males born in the origin and enumerated 
in the destination during the census period of 1960 as the dependent 
variable, and origin and destination income, urbanization~ education, 
and distance between origin and destination units as independent varia-
. 15 bles. The study considers the 25 administrative regions in Egypt as 
the spatial units of labor supply. 
Using the least-squares method to estimate the model in the log-
linear form, in which the estimated coefficients are interpreted as 
elasticities, the independent variables are found to explain 75 percent 
of the variation in labor migration and all of the estimated coefficient 
are significant at five percent level, and with the expected sign. 
The results show that the income elasticity of migration in desti--
nation is positive but inelastic, with a coefficient of .651, and in the 
origin it is elastic with a negative coefficient of 1.406. This result 
suggests that a ten percent increase in the wage level of destination 
ceteris paribus, will encourage migration by 6. 51 percent,. while similar 
increases at the origin will retard migration by 14.06 percent. Dis-
tance is also found to have an adverse effect on migration. Population, 
of both the origin and the destination, is a significant determinant of 
interregional migration in Egypt. However, the "pull" effect of the 
population at destination at destination is twice as large as the "push" 
effect of population at the origin, with elasticities of positive 1.69 
and .844 respectively. These results are in accord with the hypothesis 
that migrants are attracted to regions which have large labor markets, 
15 Michael J. Greenwood, "The Determinants of Labor Mi,gration in 
Egypt," Journal of Regional Science, IX (1979), pp. 283-90. 
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or that persons tend to migrate to regions to which natives o"f their 
home region have previously migrated. Finally, urbanization measured 
as a percent of the population living in urban areas at the origin or 
destination area, is found to increase migration, emphasizing the ten-
dency of people who migrate to urban centers, of coming from a rela-
16 
tively large urban population too. 
A rather different study for South Korea using the human capital 
17 approach, for the period 1961-1966, reached similar conclusions. The 
best version of the est:lmated relation is when migration rate is regress-
ed on expected income in both destination and origin, distance, and 
affinity, which is defined as the number of persons who were born in 
the province of outmigration now living in the province of destination. 
The estimated parameters suggest that a ten percent change (increase or 
decrease) in the expected income at destination will change migration 
tincrease or decreas) by 12.8 percent, while the same percentage change 
at destination changes migration by seven percent. The results also 
show that distance, although it has an expected negative sign, is in-
significant, while at the same time the affinity coefficient has a 
positive and significant effect. This finding, the author explains, is 
perhaps an indication that the social space as defined by the affinity 
variable is perhaps more important than physical space as defined by 
distance. This may be considered a typical situation of the developing 
countries, where the job search process is highly informal or relies on 
16Ibid., p. 290. 
17 Burtrand Renaud, "The Economic Determinants of Internal Migration 
in Korea," Applied Economics, IX (1977), pp. 307-18. 
18 personal connections rather than labor market information. 
Finally, a study attempting to estimate the supply function of 
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qualified emigrants from 23. countries into the U.S. is reviewed below. 
The list of countries include developed as well as developing nations. 
The results show the wages of professionals in.the country of desti-
nation relative to those in the country of origin, which account for 
about one-fourth of the variation in the propensity to emigrate. Further-
more, the implied supply elasticity (the elasticity of emigration with 
respect to the destination wage) is of the order 0.4. Among the other 
variables tried, distance was found to be unimportant, while relative 
per capita income had one half the explanatory power of relative wages. 
Also, the results show that imposing a surtax, i.e., a tax imposed on 
income of emigrants, would have a negligible deterrent effect on the 
number of emigrants. Thus, such a surtax would provide a pure revenue 
source to developing countries. 
Consequences of Labor Migration on the 
Sending Country 
In this section, the consequences of labor migration on the send-
ing country from a neoclassical viewpoint and its limitations will be 
reviewed. Issues encountered in the "brain drain" assessment will be 
discussed. Finally, a selective empirical evidence on the consequences 
of labor migration will be presented. 
18Ibid. , p. 314. 
19 George Psacharopoulos, "Estimating Some Key Parameters in the 
Brain Drain Taxation Model," Journal of Development Economics, II (1975), 
pp. 309-318. 
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Although this study is concerned only with consequences of labor migra-
tion on the sending country, it is perhaps appropriate here to allude 
to the varied and rich literature on the theoretical analysis of the 
problem of welfare effects of the international migration of labor. 
This literature occasionally has divergent conclusions, due mainly to 
the different theoretical analyses which are applied to the many facets 
of such a problem. Those different theoretical analyses, according to 
Bhagwati and Rodriguez can be classified according to whether (a) they 
use a comparative-static or dynamic formulation; (b) they assume a per-
fectly competitive model or one with policy imposed distortions; and 
(c) they address thmselves to the welfare of the country of emigration 
20 or immigration, or take a world-welfare viewpoint. 
The Neoclassical Viewpoint and Its 
Limitations 
"The consequences of international labor migration on the country 
of origin would be neither worse nor better off. If the migrant sends 
funds back home, then the nation would gain." This general conclusion 
21 is argued by Grubel and Scott. This argument assumes that the migrant 
has been employed and is paid his marginal product, and that when he 
moves out of the country he withdraws his consumption which is equiva-
lent to his contribution to production. 
20 . 
Jagdish Bhagwati and Carlos Rodriguez, "Welfare Theoretical Analy-
sis of the Brain Drain," Journal of Development Economics, II (1975), 
pp. 195-221. 
21 
Herbert B. Grubel and Anthony D. Scott, "The International Flow 
of Human Capital," American Economic Review, LVI (1966),: pp. 268-83. 
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A counterargument forwarded by Aitken shows the limitations of this 
analysis and demonstrates that if a finite (small number) of migrants 
22 leave, the country of origin will lose. The deadweight loss or the 
familiar surplus would be the area of a triangle under the marginal pro-
duct curve and between the old wage without migration, and the new high-
er wage after migration. This loss could be significant. 
This discrepancy between the two analyses stems from the assumption 
implied in Grubel's and Scott's analysis, that only one skilled worker 
(at the margin) leaves at a time; that in the interim between departures, 
the real wage paid to those with the same kind of human capital owned by 
the migrants adapts to their new higher productivity. Then, the second 
marginal migrant leaves and the process repeats itself. In other words, 
this analysis is comparing a series of separate static comparisons of 
an economy with and without the skilled worker at the margin. While the 
correct analysis, Aitken claims, must be based on the comparison of the 
income of the population remain.ing after all emigrants have departed to 
the income the same population had been receiving prior to the departure 
23 of the skilled workers. 
Apart from the above limitation, the neoclassical theory of factor 
mobility assumes homogeneous labor. This overlooks the fact that migra-
tion is a selective process where the best trained tend to have the 
highest rates among the migrants, and generally may be in short supply 
and essential for the process of development of the origin country. 
22 Norman D. Aitken, "The International Flow of Human Capital: Com-
ment," American Economic Review, LVIII (1968), pp. 539-48.: 
23Ibid. , p. 545. 
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Issues in the "Brain Drai.n" Assessment 
A meaningful assessment of the potential loss or gain to the send-
ing country due to the inter-nation labor migration and particularly the 
highly skilled labor, the "brain drain" problem, should investigate 
24 the following questions: 
1. What happens when the loss of human capital is significant ra-
ther than marginal? 
This question implies three issues. The benefit-loss issue which has 
been analyzed above, the income redistribution issue, favoring perhaps 
the non-migrant skilled and the capital owners, and finally the effect 
on the rate of economic development. 
According to Hirshman, Myrdal, and Kaldor, economic development in 
25 the sending country or region will be adversely affected. This conclu-
sion is explained by the circular and cumulative causation or the polari-
zation effect which manifests itself as the inability of the poor re-
gions to compete with the rich regions, the selectivity of labor mobili-
ty, and the interregional wage differentials and growth. All of these 
factors will cuase more migration to the benefit of the advanced regions, 
and leave the original region stagnant. 
The counter-argument, however, maintains that the outflow of skill-
ed workers may only take from the country the amount of capital equal 
to the average ratio of the sum of human and physical capital per worker. 
24 H. Peter Gray, International Trade, Investment and Payments (Bos-
ton, 1979), p. 331. 
25Nicholas Kaldor, "The Case for Regional Policies," Scottish Jour-
nal of Political Economy, XVII (1970), pp. 337-47; G. Myrdal, Rich Land 
and Poor Land (New York, 1957); A. 0. Hirshman, The Strategy of Economic 
Development (New Haven, 1958). 
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In that case, average capital per worker necessary to sustain a 
steady growth, would not be reduced and per capita national income 
would remain roughly constant. 
2. What happens to the savings rate of society when human capi-
tal leaves? 
This dimension of the problem is concerned with the saving propen-
sities of the migrants in comparison with those left behind. If the 
migrants' average propensity to save exceeds the national average, then 
the national rate of saving will be reduced. In absence of compensat-
ing remittances, this loss could be significant. 
3.. How significant are adjustment costs in·the short and long 
run? 
The short-run costs are usually seen as any losses in production 
caused by the inability of the society to adapt instantly to the loss of 
a set of skills embodied in the migrant. The long-run cost is the cost 
which occurs over the period to find or train a replacement. Further-
more, if the country needs to maintain a given proportion of educated 
people, then the emigration of some of them forces the country to pro-
vide more education than would otherwise be necessary. This certainly 
would also be in addition to the above mentioned costs. This addition-
al cost of expanding education has no corresponding social gain unless, 
as Johnson has argued, the migrants make large transfers to their coun-
26 tries of origin. 
4. Finally, does the "brain drain" adversely affect the nation's 
·f.utnre.capacity to acquire human capital? 
26 
Harry Johnson, The Economics of the 'Brain Drain:' The Canadian 
Case, Minerva (1967), pp. 304-06. 
55 
As the expression "brain drain" is formally used, it applies to 
people qualified in a profession and refers more to acquired skills 
than to native intelligence. However, there is a Darwinian element in 
the "brain drain" problem also. 27 This argument maintains that both 
qualities, the ability to acquire human capital and the possession of 
intelligence, are directly related. Hence, the "brain drain" reduces 
the stock of human capital left in the country of origin and as a result 
is likely to cause a reduction in the average level in future genera-
tions. 
In summary, the "brain drain" may be advantageous or detrimental to 
the origin country depending on whether the characteristics of the mi-
grants are such that their activities confer positive or negative exter-
nalities on the people around them. 
Empirical Evidence on the Consequences of 
Labor Migrat:ipn 
The following review will include international as well as internal 
migration of labor, and will deal only with the most important evidence 
on the micro-macroeconomics aspects. 
On the International Level. In an evaluation of the impact of 
migration of highly skilled labor frbm Less Developed Countries (LDC) 
to Developed Countries (DC), Thomas concludes that it is not possible 
to measure the extent to which the emigration to Developed Countries 
28 has restricted the growth of t.ess Developed Countries. The divergence 
27 
H. Peter Gray, p. 331. 
28 
Brinley Thomas, Migration and Urban Development (London, 1972), 
p. 230. 
56 
between the real growth rate per capita between the two groups in the 
1960's for example, could be attributed largely to the differential 
rate of growth of population. He recommends that any estimate of the 
role of the "brain drain" as a factor contributing to this divergE7nce 
be done by examining each developing country separately, as conditions 
may vary so much. 
In another study, Shearer furnishes new evidence on the benefits 
29 of the "brain drain" to the origin country. In this comprehensive study 
the author surveys workers' remittances for LDC, and semi•developed 
countries such as Greece and Mexico. The micro-macroeconomic aspects 
of the problem are analyzed. The author concludes with respect to. the 
microeconomic aspect of the actual workers' remittances (reported and 
unreported remittances), that most go directly to the poor families of 
the migrants' home country, and this perhaps constitutes the most effi-
cient form of foreign aid. 
The macroeconomic aspect of the workers' remittances is also eval-
uated in this study. The author's evidence suggests that for a number 
of LDCs, remittances constitute a considerable percentage.of the total 
value of exports (in the case of Jordan, they averaged 67.8 over the 
ten-year period of 1967-76). This reflects an obvious gain of foreign 
exchange, which in many cases, its lack reflects one of the basic ob-
stacles facing LDC. Based on the above evidence, the author recommends 
a close investigation of workers' remittances for each individual coun-
try, and it might be the justification to encourage rather than 
29 John C. Shearer, "The Role of Remittances in the 'Brain Drain' 
Controversy," a paper presented at the Midwestern Economic Association 
Meeting, Chicago, April, 1978, ·pp. 1-14. 
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discourage the export of human capital. 
Yet another study of the effects of labor migration in North Yemen, 
shows adverse effects on production, increasing consumption imports, and 
30 higher prices of land. Two main factors contribute to the above con-
elusions. One is the labor intensive nature of agriculture in North 
Yemen, and the inability of the country to absorb the available technolo-
gy to replace the migrant workers. Also, the high wage of the remaining 
workers forces the marginal land to be dropped out of cultivation, and 
hence production declines and the country has to increase its imported 
food. The second factor explains how the prices of land go up. Despite 
a favorable effect on household income due to workers' remittances, they 
manifest undesirable effects because of the desire to translate wealth 
into capital in the face of a limited investment opportunity. This ere-
ates greater demand for land and hence their prices are inflated. 
On the Internal Level. In migration literature a considerable vol-
ume of studies on the consequences of labor migration is concerned with 
the internal migration between low-:tncom~ low-wage regions (South), and 
high-income high-wage regions .(North). A central empirical argument of 
these studies is whether migration equalizes factor return (wages) be-
tween North and South or helps the growth of regions. Inconsistent evi-
dence has been found for many countries. 
30 . Jon C. Swanson, "Some Consequences of Emigrat1on for Rural 
Economic Development in the Yemen Arab Republic," The Middle East Jour-
nal, XXXIII (1979), pp. 34-42. 
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Studies of United States South-North labor migration by Barts and 
Muth in separate findings, have concluded that migration of labor 
failed to converge wages despite a large interstate migration from low 
31 to high-wage states. Borts attributes this divergence to the strong 
role of demand for the products of high-wage industries in the North. 
Rather contradictory findings to the above are presented by Coelho-
32 Ghali and by Bellante in separate studies. For example, Bellante's 
study of production workers in manufacturing, using adjustment for cost 
of living difference between Southern and Northern per capita money 
earnings, concludes that the North-South wage differential does not 
exist. 
Studies of internal migration in LDCs are also inconsistent. 
A study of the impact of rural to urban migration :f.n Morocco, using a 
macroeconomic model, shows that higher rates of internal migration lead 
to an increase in total real income in Morocco. 33 At the same time, ur-
ban production share increases at the expense of agricultural share in 
the rural sector, which shows a decline. A similar study on Brazil 
finds that the internal migration has been a positive factor in the 
31George H. Borts, "The Equalization of Returns and Regional Eco-
nomic Growth," American Economic Review, L (1960, pp. 319-47; R. F. Muth, 
"Migration, Chicken or Egg,: Southern Economic Journal, XXXVII (1970-71), 
pp. 295-306. 
32Philip R. Coelho and Moheb A. Ghali, "The End of the North-South 
Wage Differential," American Economic Review, LXI (1971), pp. 932-37; 
D. Bellante, "The North-South Differential and the Migration of Hetero-
genous Lanor," American Economic Review, LXIX (1979), pp. 166-179. 
33M. T. Mertaugh, "The Causes and Effects of Rural-Urban Migration 
in Morocco," (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1976). 
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34 country's development. The study also shows that increasing the rate 
of migration has a positive effect on the distribution of income between 
the urban and rural sectors. 
The microeconomic studies of internal migration have focused on the 
amount and use of remittances which migrants send home, and on the effect 
of migration on the rural production process. A study of a village in 
India concludes that remittances facilitate a shift to crops entailing 
35 higher risks and demanding a greater investment. The author of another 
study of small farmers in Uganda and Kenya concludes that urban-rural 
36 remittances constitute a significant source of working capital. 
On the Middle East Region. Labor migration in the Middle East has been 
lately under study from international as well as national bodies and institu-
tions. The most significant is the ILO connnissioned "International Migration 
Project" (IMP) to study and collect data on patterns and trends of migra-
tion in the Middle East. IMP has already published several studies em labor 
migration for countries of the labor-rich Arab states and oil-ri.chArab states. 
This seminal work will be useful for many scholars and researchers 
and is frequently drawn upon in this study. However, its main shortcoming 
is the absence of time series on flows of labor migrants from each send-
ing country to a receiving one. This is necessary for empirical testing 
of the variation of gross migration flows as explained by the economic 
variables of both the sending country and the receiving country. 
34 Lorene Yap, "Internal Migration and Economic Development in Bra-
zil," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XC (1976), pp. 119-37, a summary 
of the author's unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Harvard University, 1972). 
35s. R. Simon, "Changes in Income, Consumption, and Investment in an 
Eastern Uttar Pradesh Vi.llage," (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972). 
36 Alan R. Waters, "Migration, Remittances, and the Cash Constraint in 
African Smallholder Economic Development," Oxford Economic Paper, XYY (1973), 
pp. 435-54. 
CHAPTER IV 
DETERMINANTS OF LABOR MIGRATION FROM 
LABOR~RICH ARAB STATES (LRAS) To· 
OIL-RICH ARAB STATES (ORAS) 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section pre-
sents econometric models of the determinants of labor migration between 
LRAS and ORAS. A discussion of the model variables and specifications 
is also presented in this section together with the implications of the 
different models to be used. The estimated models and the analysis of 
the results and findings are presented in section two. The analysis of 
the results includes the findings of the models for LRAS as a labor 
supplier group as well as the findings for each individual country. 
Particular emphasis is given to the Jordanian results. The analysis of 
the results also includes the estimated relations for each individual 
labor receiving country of the ORAS and its relative attr~ction to labor 
innnigrat:ion. 
Econometric Models-of Determinants 
of Labor Migration 
Arab states in this study can be classified into two :-distinct 
groups on the basis of resource endowment or income. On ~he basis of 
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resource endowment, the first group could be considered as labor-rich 
(LRAS) or labor-abundant states. This group includes Jordan, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Sudan, Syria and the two Yemens (North Yemen and South Yemen). 
The second group which can be considered as oil-rich (ORAS) includes 
Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On the basis of per capita income, the 
labor-rich group can be classified as a low-income group. The oil-rich 
countries can be considered a high-income group. 
Based upon the above classification, three econometric regression 
models were specified. One model utilizes the oil revenues as an im-
portant explanatory variable in the migration function of labor from 
LRAS to ORAS. This model is termed the "Oil :Attraction Model. tl. The 
; •. 
second model utilizes income level in both destination an_d origin as im..,. 
portant variables to account for "pull 11 or "push11 variables in the mi..-
gration function of labor. This model is termed the "Income Attraction 
Model." The third relation to be specified is a simple version of the 
theory of investment in human capital. This model considered the rela.,.. 
tive income ratio between the destination and the origin countries as 
the important variable to account for the observed migration pattern 
between the two groups. This model will be termed as "Investment in 
Human Capital Model." All three models are essentially the same; and 
relying on elements of "push-pull" factors and "human capital theory."· 
The labor migration models for LRAS to ORAS are specified as fol..,. 
lows: 
Oil Attraction Model 
(1) Mij = f (OR, Yi, l?i, Dij, e) 
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Income Attraction Model 
(2) Mij • f (Yi, Yj, Pi, Pj, Dij, e) 
Investment in Human Capital Model 
(3) Mij = f (Yj/Yi, Pj/Pi, Dij, e) 
where: 
Mij = The number of migrant workers from origin (i) to 
destination (j). 
OR = The "oil attraction" variable or oil revenues. 
Pi = Population of origin (i). 
Pj = Population of destination (j) • 
Dij = Air miles distance between the capital city in· (i) to capi-
tal city in (j). 
Yi = The per capita income in the origin (i). 
Yj =The per capita income in the destination (j). 
e = The error term 
i = 1 . • • 7 
j = 1 9 
Models' Empirical Implications 
i 
Multiple regression analysis, which the above models: represent, 
is the analytical framework to be applied to estimate the determinants 
of labor migration in the Arab region of the Middle East .. This method 
is flexible and lends itself to both cross-section and time series data. 
In addition, it is adequate for answering many of the questions concern-
ing the magnitudes of determinants of labor migration, thTir signifi-
cance, and their policy implications. 
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' Specifically, the emprical analysis of this chapter'tlncludes 
the: 
1. Estimation of the determinants of labor migration for LRAS 
group. 
2. Estimation of the determinants of labor migration for each in-
dividual labor exporting country. 
3. Estimation of the determinants of immigration for ORAS groupt 
and for individual countries. 
4. Evaluation of selected policy actions to control migration 
flows, either by the sending countries or the receiving ones. 
5. Testing the hypothesis that Palestinians, due to their dis-
placement as a result of the creation of Israel in 1948, are 
more mobile than other Arabs. I 
6. Testing the hypothesis that oil alone can explain the observed· 
pattern of labor migratiort from LRAS group to ORAS. 
Models' Variables and Specifications 
Migration Flows. The dependent variable to be explained in the 
above models (Mij) refers to the total number of workers ~oth male and 
·female from the Arab labor exporting countries (i), and who were actual-
ly holding jobs in the ORAS in 1975. It is assumed in this study that 
, over 90 percent of all Arab labor migrants to ORAS actual~y occurred 
after 1960. 
Migration flows as defined above, raise two problems to be discuss-
ed. The first problem is a general one and is concerned ~ith migration 
studies and the effect of the time period. The second pr~blem is speci-
i 
fie to this study and is concerned with the assumption that over 90 
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percent of all labor migrations occurred after 1960. 
With regard to the general problem, empirical studies on migration 
have used several time periods depending on the quality :of the 
data at hand. 1 Renaud emphasizes three time periods that have frequent-
ly been used. One-year intervals, five-year intervals, and life-time 
migration flows have been used. Greenwood, on the other hand, in a 
study of internal determinants of migration in Egypt, used the cumula-
tive male migration as reported in the 1960 census data, assuming that 
2 over 60 percent of all migration occurred after 1947. 
The problem which arises, apart from the adequacy of the data at 
hand, is that the longer the time period for which the migratory flows 
are defined, the greater the probability that the migration flows may 
influence the independent variables. In this study, however, the as-
sumption is that such influences, which creates simultanedty problems, 
is minimal. This brings us to the specific problem of th~s study. 
The assumption in this study is that about 90 percent of migration 
flows from LRAS to ORAS had occurred between 1960 and 1975. This as-
sumption is based on the inspection of the available data on labor mi-
gration of the area, and on the facts of oil exports of the ORAS. Three 
of the countries of the ORAS started their oil exports i~ the 1960s, 
Algeria, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates; and Oman i~l970. 3 
1 Bertrand Renaud, "The Economic Determinants of Internal Migration 
in Korea," Applied Economics, IX (1977), p. 314. 
2 Michael J. Greenwood, "The Determinants of Labor Migration in 
Egypt," Journal of Regional Science, IX (1969), p. 284. · 
3oPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin (Vienna, 1977), pp. 3-5. 
: ~ 
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Although Bahrain, Iraq and Qatar, began their oil exports in the 1940s, 
they comprise the minor labor importing countries with a 'share of 
less than three percent out of the cumulative total of all Arab labor 
4 migrants in 1975. 
The analysis so far does not include two important labor immigra-
tion countries in the ORAS group, namely, Saudi Arabia arid Kuwait, whose 
combined share amounts to about 71 percent of all the cumulative Arab 
labor immigrants in ORAS up to the end of 1975, and whose commercial 
oil exports started after World War II. In Kuwait, about 87 percent 
of the total male migrant population of all ages had been. in Kuwait 
for 14 years or less. 5 This suggests that 87 percent of all males had 
either migrated or were born in Kuwait after 1961. With ·respect to im-
1 
migrants in Saudi Arabia, her share was about 53 percent of all Arab 
labor migrants in 1975. Birks and Sinclair estimated that non-nation-
al labor migrants in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were between 50 and 70 
thousand in 1963. 6 This figure amounts only to 7 to 10 percent of the 
labor migrant stock in 1975. In other words, this means 'that about 90 
to 93 percent of all labor migrants in Saudi Arabia immigrated after 
1963. 
The above analysis establishes 1960 to 1975 as a reference period 
for this study to define the migration flows between the LRAS group and 
the ORAS group. 
4 
J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration Project: 
A Summary of Provisional Findings, Empirical Patterns, Past Trends and 
Future Development (Durham, 1978), p. 13. 
5central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Abstracts 1977 
(Kuwait, 1977), p. 63. 
6 J. s. Birks and c. A. Sinclair, The International Migration Pro-
ject, Country Case Study: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Durham, 1978), 
p. 13. 
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Oil Revenue. Oil is the most single important source of revenue 
for all of the ORAS' governments. As an example, the value of oil ex-
ports as a percentage of total exports were 99.9 percent in 1976 for 
Saudi Arabia; 91.3 percent for Kuwait; 96.8 percent for UAE, 99.9 per-
7 cent for Libya, and 98.3 percent for Iraq. 
Governments in ORAS, as in most developing nations, play a prin-
cipal role in the process of development. Their budget expenditures, 
mainly from oil revenues, play the important role in creating employ-
ment opportunities and the demand for labor. The private sector in 
most of these countries creates employment opportunities as well, but 
it is a reasonable assumption that their ability to create jobs is af-
fected by the atmosphere which may be created by the government eco-
nomic activities. One would expect the private sector to expand or 
contract its business activities and the creation of employment oppor-
nities in concurrence with the expansion or contraction of tlae public sector. 
In the "Oil Attraction Model," oil revenue is expected to be posi-
tively related to migration flow. Its attractive power will increase 
migration when it is increased, and will decrease labor migration when 
oil revenues decrease. However, the fact must be recognized that it 
is not oil revenue as such which creates demand for migrant labor, it 
is oil revenues coupled with their use in development expenditure. 
Here the implied assumption is that all governments in the ORAS group 
are using the oil revenue for development. 
Origin Population (Pi) and Destination Population (Pj) • In the 
absence of international labor migration between countries, the total 
.I 
7 OPEC, pp, 3-5. 
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quantity of labor supplied to an economy depends on (1) the size of the 
population, (2) the percentage of that population that chooses to be 
in the labor force, and (3) the hours that labor force participants 
8 choose to supply. Assuming that (2) and (3) are given or constant, 
then labor supply in the short run without migration or in a closed 
economy depends on the size of the population. 
Relaxing the assumption of closed economy, to an open economy 
with free labor mobility, we would expect the larger the population 
size, the larger the emigration of labor would be, given attractive op-
portunities abroad. On the other hand, the less the population size, 
the less the emigration would be, given the same or similar attractions 
abroad. In other words, there would be a ppsitive relationship between 
the migration flow and the population size in an open economy, once the 
opportunities abroad are attractive to the migrants. 
In this study, the origin population (Pi), represents the low in-
come and the labor abundant group, hence, based upon the above, we ex-
pect a positive and direct relationsh:l.p between the origin population 
(Pi) and the migration flow (Mij). The implied assumption here with 
respect to population at the origin is that given the cross-section data, 
labor in all different LRAS is homogeneous, and hence, only the size of 
population is different. For example, Egypt has the largest population 
size in the LRAS group, according to this formulation, she is expected 
to show a greater number of labor migrants than Jordan, which has a 
smaller population size. 
The above analysis of labor supply, given free mobility of labor, 
8 Don Bellante and Mark Jackson, Labor Economics: Choice in Labor 
Markets (New York, 1979), p. 48. 
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suggests that we expect a similar relationship between the population 
size (Pj) of the destination country and the number of laborers immi-
grating (Mij) to that country. For example, given that the ORAS group 
is the rich group with the higher income and better employment opportun-
ities, and has a greater demand expansion for labor, we would expect 
that these countries would meet their demand for labor from their popu-
lation plus the labor immigration. Given that this group is homogenous-
ly rich, then migration to this group would be larger to these coun-
tries with larger population size. Iraq as an example, or Algeria, 
whose population size is large, would be expected to have more migrants, 
while Kuwait or Libya, whose population sizes are relatively smaller, 
would be expected to have fewer migrants. Thus, the relationship be-
tween the migration flow (Mij) and the destination population would be 
positive. 
Income in Origin (Yj) and Income in Destination (Yi) 
In this study, the "income attraction model" uses the level of per 
capita income in origin (Yi); the low-income group, and (Yj), the des-
tination per capita income in high-income group. Given free choice by 
workers, one would expect that the higher the income in the destination, 
ceteris paribus, the larger the number of migrants, and the lower the 
per capita income in destination, the fewer the number of migrants. 
Hence, there is an expected direct or positive relationship between 
the migration flow and the destination income (Yj). 
On the other hand, the origin income (Yi), is the per capita in-
come of the low-income group. Hence, it is expected that the lower the 
income, the larger the migration flow to the higher income group or 
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ORAS. While the higher the income in the origin, the lower the flow 
of migration. This means a negative relationship is expected between 
the level of per capita income in the origin (Yi) and the migration 
flow (Mij). 
Income Ratio (Yj/Yi). The investment in the human capital theory 
assumes that the decision to migrate from one place to another is an 
individual decision. It postulates that the potential migrant will 
move if the present value of an expected future income stream in some 
other place exceeds the present value of the expected inc'Ome stream in 
the present place or residence by more than the cost of migration. 
In the simplifued version of this theory, assuming zero cost, 
income ratio (Yj/Yi), represents an average rate of return. The indi-
vidual decides to move or stay based upon the value of this ratio. If 
it is one or less, he stays at his residence, if it is greater than one, 
then he migrates to (j) destination. This is because if the ratio is 
one or less, then according to this formulation, he is as well off or 
better in his place (i) than in place (j). But if the ratio is greater 
than one, then at least there is a country (j) where he wpuld be better 
off. Thus, there exists a positive relationship between migration flow 
and the income ratio (Yj/Yi). 
Distance Dij. The hypothesis that migration decreases substantial-
ly with increased distance, has been attributed to the fact that dis-
tance serves as a proxy for both the direct cost of transfer and adjust-
ment, and the psychological costs of movement, as well as for the 
availability of information, which is assumed to decrease as the 
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distance moved increases. Thus, in the above three models we expect 
an inverse relationship to exist between migration flow (Mij) and dis-
tance (Dij ) . 
Population Ratio Pj /PL We would expect a positive relationship 
between 'the migration flow and the population ratio. The greater the 
population ratio, the greater the "pull" effect at the destination. 
In this formulation, it is similar to the income ratio and would show 
a similar effect. 
Data 
All variable values refer to the 1975 time period. Migration 
flows (Mij) are in thousands, and consist of a matrix of seven labor-
rich Arab states (LRAS), as the origin of the migrants, and nine labor 
importing countries (ORAS), as the destination countries. Oil revenues 
are in billions of dollars, and per capita income is in dollars. Popu-
lation is presented in hundred thousands. Distance is in air miles 
distance between the two capitals of the countries of origin and desti-
nation. Any changes in the units of data included in the model estima-
tion will be reported with the analysis of that model. 
Finally, the sources of data are documented in a separate appendix 
to this dissertation. 
Estimation and Analysis 
The analysis of the estimated results is presented in this section, 
9 Michael J. Greenwood, p. 398. 
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which will be divided into three subsections. The first will be the 
analysis of the results of the LRAS group and the individual countries 
of this group. The second will present the results and analysis of the 
ORAS group, and each country of this group. The final subsection will 
present the tests of two hypotheses; the displacements of the Palestin-
ians and mobility; and the oil revenue attraction and labor migration. 
LRAS Group and Determinants of Migration 
The estimation of the parameters of the three models appear in 
Table X. For each model, the effect of every variable, whether it in-
creases migration or decreases it, is represented by the magnitude and 
sign of the estimated coefficient. In this estimation the log-linear 
form to the function is applied, hence, the magnitude of the estimated 
parameter stands for the elasticity of the variable, and the sign de-
notes whether a negative or positiv~ relation exists between the inde-
pendent variable and the migration rate (here, migration rate is used 
as the dependent variable, and it is equal to the total number of mi-
grants from i to j, divided by the population i). 
The general performance of the independent variables in the three 
models, seems to be good. This is reflected in two ways. The explana-
tory power of the independent variables, accounts for about 49 percent 
to 51 percent of the migration rate variation, and the significance 
level of the estimated coefficients of those variables which range be-
tween a one percent level for a number of them such as population in 
the origin, to ten percent level for variables such as income in the 
origin. Other variables are significant at a five percent level. Oil 
revenue, income level, and the income ratio of labor migration have the 
TABLE X 
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS OF DETERMINANTS OF 
LABOR MIGRATION FOR (LRAS) GROUP 
Dependent Variable: Mij/Pi 






















*significant level at 1% 
**significant level at 5% 
***significant level at 10% 
Estimated Absolute 
R2 Coefficient t-Ratio 
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expected "pull" effect on migration and are significant at five percent 
level or better. 
Both distance and population at the origin have unexpected signs, 
and opposite to the hypothesized relationship. The results show a neg-
ative elasticity of population at the origin and a positive elastic!-
ty of distance. 
With respect to the negative elasticity of population at origin, 
the result is unexpected, and is in disagreement with the specified 
labor supply hypothesis. This result suggests that smal~er populations 
supply more migrants than larger populations. The larger populations 
seem to have less migrants than expected, and the smaller populations 
have more. This could be explained perhaps by some kind of restrictions 
on the movement of migrants on countries with large populations such as 
Egypt, Sudan, and Syria, imposed by government policies either at home 
or by the host countries. While the countries with smalter populations 
have less or no restrictions on their movement, either from both govern-
ments at home or at destination. The historical evidence shows that 
Egypt and Syria, for example, had been following a restrictive policy 
toward emigration of labor during the 1960s. Jordan and the two Yemens, 
on the other hand, followed a lax policy toward emigration during this 
period. It could perhaps have been the case that the Oil states favor 
immigrants from countries with smaller populations. 
As for the distance effect on migration, the positive and high 
elasticity is quite unexpected and interesting at the same time. Dis-
tance is hypothesized to be negatively related to migration, because it 
! 
is a proxy for total cost and availability of informatio~. 
The fact that the distance variable is positive and significant, 
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suggests that moving costs are not an important deterrent to migration 
between the two Arab groups. The high elasticity of distance, 2.3 might 
suggest that the Arab labor migrant is willing to travel over long dis-
tances to capture the opportunities which might be open to him in the 
oil-rich states. However, this is not a final conclusion. The inves-
tigation below shows that this is not the case. 
An argument could be made to account for the unexpected sign of 
distance. This is perhaps due to the specification and definition of 
the dependent variable (the migration rate), which is defined as the 
total number of labor migrants from i to j, divided by the population 
in i. 
In the above migration models if larger numbers of migrants happen 
to come .from smaller populations, even if they have the same behavior 
toward distance, as those migrants who came from larger populations, 
then the migration rate would show a systematic relation to distance, 
and this could bias the estimated elasticity of the distance upward. 
Thus, the above argument suggests that a re-definition of migration 
rate may reveal the true behavior or response of labor migrants towards 
distance. 
With regard to this problem and with reference to the problems as-
sociated with the choice of the dependent variable for cross-section 
studies of migration, Geoffrey Young points out that 
The difficulty with any procedure which does not correctly 
allow for the effect of population size arises from the fact 
that the economic characteristics--the income, urbanization, 
education levels, or remoteness--of the political divisions 
of a country may be correlated with their populations.l0 
10 Geoffrey Young, "Choice of Dependent Variable for Cross-Section 
Studies of Migration." Canadian Journal of Economics, VIII (1975), p. 
49. 
75 
The author goes on to say that the choice of the dependent variable for 
cross-section analyses of the determinants of interregional migration 
requires that some allowance be made for varying regionpopulations. He 
points out that some of the normalization that has been used in empiri-
cal studies of migration may bias the estimated coefficients of explan-
atory variables correlated with population size. The following normali-
zation procedure, which avoids the above b::lasedness is then suggested: 
Normalized Variable = MijP/PiPj 
where (P) is total population and other variables are as defined before. 
This variable could be thought of as a "migration parameter," for mi-
gration from a small place to another areas, as the proportion of the 
population of the sending place which would migrate to the receiving 
area if the population of the latter were equal to that of the entire 
country. In cases where wide variations in a region's population exist, 
it is appropriate to make a correction for heteroskedasticity (when the 
error terms are not independently distributed with zero mean and cons-
11 
tant variance, as the classical least-squares method assumes). For 
example, the variance of labor migrants among countries with large popu-
lations, may be greater than the variance among small countries with 
small populations. Regressions using the above suggested "migration 
parameter" as a dependent variable instead of the migration rate, and 
a correction for the heteroskedasticity were estimated for the three 
specified models. Though the correct specification for the cause of 
heteroskedasticity is not known, it is specified here that countries of 
the ORAS group with smaller populations have less variation in their 
11 Ibid., p. 97. 
immigrants than the countries with larger populations. 
The re-estimated models are shown in Table XI. However, before 
starting a detailed analysis of the findings, two observations about 
the new estimation are in order. The first is concerned with the ex-
planatory power of the re-estimated models which it has increased for 
two models, the "oil attraction model" from 50.5 percent to 54.8 per-
cent, and for the "income attraction model" from 49.9 percent to 63 
percent; but decreased for the "investment in human capital model" 
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from 48.6 percent to 33.6 percent. The second observation, is that the 
sign of the distance coefficient has changed to a negative sign and is 
statistically significant in all three models. Therefore, the above 
observations show that the new procedure yields better results than the 
previous one. 
Further evidence also shows that the new procedure is perhaps 
more correct. This evidence is shown by a third estimation of the models 
where only the migration flow (Mij) is used as a dependent variable, 
i.e. without any normalization. The significance of not including the 
population variable in the left-hand side of the migration function is 
to reduce the correlation between population and the explanatory vari-
ables in the right-hand side to zero, and, thus, insure against any 
bias in the estimated coefficients due to this correlation. 
The results of this estimation appear in Table XII. Distance elas-
ticity in this estimation is negative and significant at five percent 
level or better in the three models. This is in accordance with the re-
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It should be noted that the inclusion of a dummy variable (DUM)) in 
the form of 1 = Jordan, and 0 • otherwise, resulted in a significant dum-
my at 20 percent level and a slight change in the estimates of the para-
meters. For example, the result of the "oil attraction model" is 
Mij!:Pj * ** ln(PiPjPj) z 1.58 ln(C/Pj) + 1.14 ln(ORj) - .02 ln(Yi/Pj) -.42 ln(Pi/Pj) 
* - 1.90 ln(Dij/Pj) + .45 DUMln(Pi/Pj) 
and for the "income attraction model" is 
ln(~~~~:;) = .03 l~C/Pj) -.03 ln(Yi/Pj) + 1.66(Yj/Pj)* -.42 ln(Pi/Pj)** 
+.03 ln(Pi/Pj) - 1.99 ln(Dij/Pj)* + .45 DUMln(Pi/Pj) R2=.64 
TABLE XII 
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS OF DETERMINANTS OF 
LABOR MIGRATION FOR (LRAS) GROUP 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Mij "Flow" 
Form of Equation: Log Linear n=63 
Independent Estimated Absolute 
R2 Model Variable Coefficient t-Ratio 
Oil Attrac- .50 
tion Model OR 1.081 5.63 
Yi - .299 .982 
Pi .151 .852 
Pj - .226 1.59 
Dij - .946 2.02 
c .941 .19 
Income Attrac- .57 
tion Model Yi - .317 1.128 
Yj 1.498 6.88 
Pi .154 1.947 
Pj .799 5.80 
Dij -1.081 2.59 
c -9.20 1. 76 
Investment in .40 
Human Capital Yj/Yi .931 4.89 
Model Pj/Pi .367 3.04 
Dij -1.39 3.07 
c 9.16 2.78 
*significant level at 1% 












From the above, it seems plausible to assume that the results ob-
tained with positive distance elasticity and negative elasticity of 
population at origin are not valid (when migration rate is the depen-
dent variable), rather, the results which give positive elasticity (when 
the dependent variable is the migration flow or the "migration paramet-
er" of both variables are more reasonable. 
In order to show the effect and magnitude of the determinants of 
migration between the labor-rich Arab group and the oil-rich Arab group, 
elasticities of the determinants of migration (the explanatory variables) 
are derived from the estimated models with respect to the migration 
flow (Mij). Elasticities are quite useful in this respect, since they 
show the effect of a percentage change of the independent variables on 
the dependent variable. In general, large elasticities imply that the 
dependent variable is very responsive to changes in the independent 
variable. The derived elasticities appear in Table XIII. 
In this table three elasticities are shown for each independent 
variable. These elasticities are derived from the estimated models 
using three definitions of the dependent variable, namely, (1) the 
"migration parameter;" (2) the migration flow; and (3) the migration 
rate. Although the analysis will emphasize only the results based on 
the estimated models using the "migration parameter," it is observed 
that the elasticities of this later estimation appear generally to be 
higher than the elasticities of the other two estimations. 
The table shows that both oil revenues and income have positive 
elasticities, and denote strong "pull" effect to migration flows. How-
ever, the income elasticity of migration appears to be higher than the 
oil revenue elasticity. For example, the income elasticity of the 
TABLE XIII 
ELASTICITIES OF MIGRATION BETWEEN 
LABOR-RICH ARAB STATES AND 
OIL-RICH ARAB STATES 
Oil Attraction Model 
Income Attraction 
Model 

















*significant level at 1% 
**significant level at 5% 



















































Elasticities are derived from the estimated models with the depen-
dent variable (1) as "the migration parameter;" (2) the migration flow; 
and (3) "the migration rate." 
Since the estimated relationships are of log linear form, the para-




ln Mij - ln Pi - ln Fj = ln A+ b1lnPi + b2lnPj + b3lnDij + lne 
ln Mij = ln A + (l+b1) lnPi + (l+b2) lnPj + b3lnDij + lne 
The origin population elasticity of migration is 
CllnMij = (l + b ) 
dlnPi 1 
and distance elasticity of migration is 2llnMij = 
dlnDij b3 
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"income attraction model" is 1.67 as against 1.14 in the "oil attrac-
tion model." This suggests that a ten percent increase in per capita 
income of the ORAS. cetris paribus, may increase migration flows by 
16.7 percent; while similar increases in the oil revenues would increase 
migration by 11.4 percent. These results may indicate that migrant's 
response to income is larger than the mere wealth of the oil states. 
Both populations at the origin and at destination elasticities are 
positive, but the elasticity of the latter, is much higher (it ranges 
between 1.42-2.69 in the three models) than the former population (it 
is .55 in two models). These elasticities could be interpreted that large 
populations at the origin supply have proportionately few~r migrants, 
while large populations at destination countries attract prcp,ortionately more. 
Distance elasticity is shown to be negative in the three models and 
ranges between -.52 to -1.96. This result indicates that distance has a 
dampening effect on migration. This could suggest that either costs 
(psychological and financial) or lack of information are important de~ 
terrents to migration between the two Arab groups. The high elasticity 
of distance indicates that migrants prefer to travel to the nearerstates 
rather than to the farther states. 
Finally, income at the origin elasticity has a negative sign in the 
three models, but is only significant in the "investment in human capital 
model." This elasticity indicates that income at the origin acts as a 
"push" factor to migration. The lat·ger the differential of. income be-
tween the ORAS group and LRAS group, the higher the migration flow from 
LRAS to the ORAS group. 
In summary, the above analysis of the effects of determinants of 
migration as reflected by their elasticities reveal that oil revenues, 
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income level at destination and the income ratio are important determi-
nants of migration between the two Arab groups. The analysis shows also 
that both populations at the origin and at the destination are positive-
ly affecting the migration flow between the two groups. 
On the other hand, distance is found to have a negative effect on 
the migration flows. This could reflect that high costs O+ lack of in-
formation are factors which could make migration flows to the farther 
states less than to the nearer states. 
The theoretical implications of the classical theory of factor mo-
bility, which predicts that migration from low-income places to high-
income places, or from the low growth countries to the high growth and 
expanding countries, seems to be empirically supported by the findings 
of these models. The level of income in the origin country has a dampen-
ing effect or "push" factor, while the income level at destination has a 
"pull" effect on the migrants. Aside from the social costs which migra-
tion may cause on origin and destination countries, and which are not 
considered in this study, one would come to the conclusion that the 
present pattern of the migration flows between the two groups is in the 
right direction, and constitutes an efficient process of r'esource trans-
fer and reallocation of labor from lower income states in the LRAS group 
to high income states in the ORAS group. 
Individual LRAS Determinants of 
Migration 
Since the labor-rich Arab states vary in their characteristics, it 
is likely that the factors that influence migration from e-ach~individual 
country will differ in importance. For example, differences in income 
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level, education, and population may result in migration elasticities 
that differ markedly for each country. This would have i~portant policy 
implications and prescriptions which could be drawn for each country 
separately. 
In this section of the present study, we consider each country as 
an origin, and analyze the determinants of the migration flow~ from each 
country of the ORAS. This procedure results in separate estimates for 
Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, the two Yemens, and Sudan. 
The two models employed for individual countries are the ''invest-
ment in human capital model" and the "oil attraction model." These two 
models are basically the same as were employed for the LRAS as a group. 
However, there are two exceptions specified here. First, in the "invest-
ment in human capital model," the dependent variable is deflated in two 
ways; one by the population of the origin i, and another by the total 
labor migrant. Second, instead of the population level, as independent 
variables in the "oil attraction model," the ratio of population(Pj/Pi) 
is used. 
The results for both models appear in Tables XIV, XV, and XVI below, 
and the analysis.of the estimated relation would follow in the same 
order. Table XIV contains the estimated relations of LRAS as a group 
and of each individual sending country. The dependent variable of these 
relations is the migration flows deflated by the total lab.Pr migrant.. The 
parameters were estimated by least-squares and log-linear relationships 
were fitted. 
The explanatory power of the regression for LRAS group is reasonably 
good and the variables explain 40 percent of changes in the migration 
flows. All the coefficients are significant at a·one percent level, and 
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TABLE XIV 
MODEL: INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 
Dependent Variable: Mij /1.158 
Independent Estimated Absolute 
R2 
Significance 
Country Variable Coefficient t-Ratio Level 
LRAS .40 
Yj/Yi .93 4.91 * 
Pj/Pi .38 3.17 * 
Dij - 1.32 2.94 * 
c 8.59 2.6 
Jordan .846 
Yj/Yi 1.98 4.55 * 
Pj/Pi .76 2.66 ** 
Dij - 1.13 1.32 
c 5.75 .925 
Egypt .588 
Yj/Yi 1.46 1.94 *** 
Pj/Pi .68 1. 31 
Dij - 1.45 .66 
c 10.43 .66 
Syria .75 
Yj/Yi 2.11 3.85 * 
Pj/Pi .90 2.47 ** 
Dij 1.26 1.19 
c -10.68 1.42 
Lebanon .838 
Yj/Yi 1.15 4.21 * 
Pj/Pi 1.10 4.49 * 
Dij .05 .07 
c .37 .06 
North Yemen .83 
Yj/Yi .92 2.70 ** 
Pj/Pi .78 3. 71 * 
Dij - 1.90 2.49 ** 
c 11.64 1.93 
South Yemen .82 
Yj/Yi .97 2.13 *** 
Pj/Pi. 1.01 3.53 * 
Dij - 2.55 3.06 * 
c 17.27 2.64 
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TABLE XIV (Continued) 
Independent Estimated Absolute 
R2 
Significance 
Country Variable Coefficient t-Ratio Level 
Sudan .575 
Yj/Yi 1.33 1.85 
Pj/Pi .85 1.95 *** 
Dij .51 .35 
c - 1.99 .17 
*significant level at 1 % 
**significant level at 5% 
***significant level at 10% 
"Chow test" was applied to see if the difference between the esti-
mated coefficients (elasticities) for the individual countries.is not 
statistically significant; and the conclusion of the test at one percent 
level was the rejection of the null hypothesis (equality of the coeffi-
cients), and the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis, i.e., the 
difference in the estimated elasticities is significant. 
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have the expected signs. 
The elasticities for the income ratio and population ratio are posi-
tive and equal .93 and .38 respectively. It is appropriate to note that 
these ratios can be interpreted as a difference between two logarithms. 
Hence, the greater the differential in per capita income between the des-
tination (j) and origin (i), ceteris paribus, the greater the expected 
rate of migration between i and j. Similar interpretations could be 
applied to the population ratio, and the result would be that the great-
er the difference between the destination and origin populations, the 
greater would be the migration flow from i to j. 
Thus, the resultant elasticity of income ratio for the LRAS group 
suggests that an increase of one percent in ~ncome differential would en-
courage migration by .93 percent. Similar percentage increase in the 
population differential would encourage migration by .38 percent. 
The fact that the distance elasticity is negative and significant 
suggests that moving costs or availability of information'are important 
·deterrents to migration between the LRAS and the ORAS. The magnitude of 
the distance elasticity of negative 1.32 indicates that a one percent in-
crease in the distance between origin and destination results in a 1. 32 per-
cent decrease in migration from the sending country to the receiving country. 
The individual country results show a markedly high elasticity and 
high explanatory power as compared to the LRAS group. For example, the 
2 individual country's average of income ratio elasticity and R is 1.41, 
and .79 respectively, compared to .93 and .40 for the group. Income and 
population ratios are significant in all regressions at ten percent or 
better, except in two cases; the population ratio fails to1 be signifi-
cant in the Egyptian case, and the income ratio fails to be significant 
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in the Sudanese case. In both cases, the variables have the expected 
sign. Distance fails to be significant at ten percent level in five in-
dividual regressions. 
The estimated results for Jordan show the highest explanatory power 
among the group with approximately 85 percent of the variation in the mi-
gration rate accounted for by income and population ratios and distance. 
The income ratio elasticity for Jordan is well above the average of the 
group and equals 1.98. 
Tables XV and XVI contain the estimated results of the "investment 
in human capital model" and "oil attraction model," respectively. The 
dependent variable in these estimates, the migration flow is deflated by 
the origin population. 2 The average R for individual countries of the 
investment in the "human capital model" is about .69. This is higher 
than the average of the "oil attraction model" which is equal to • 60. In-
come ratio in the first model and oil revenues in the second model have 
the correct sign for all countries except for South Yemen. The popula-
tion ratio variable in the first model is positive, except for Lebanon; 
but insignificant for most countries except for Jordan, Syria, and South 
Yemen, where it is significant at the ten percent level or better. The 
same population ratio in the "oil attraction model" shows in three cases 
a negative relation with migration rate, but only significant at five 
percent level for the Jordan case. This may suggest that Jordan's emi-
grants are attracted to the countries of the ORAS with small population, 
rather than countries with high populations. Distance is insignificant 
in both models except for Lebanon, though with a positive elasticity. 
In summary, the above estimates suggest that the best results for 
individual countries are obtained when the migration rate is deflated by 
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TABLE XV 
MODEL: INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Mij/Pi 
Form of Equation: Log Linear 
Observation: No. :9 
Independent Estimated Absolute· 
R2 
Significance 
Country Variable Coefficient t-Ratio Level 
Jordan .846 
Yj/Yi 1.985 4.554 * Pj/Pi .767 2.669 ** Dij - 1.139 1.329 X 
c - 1.995 .320 
Egypt .588 
Yj/Yi 1.465 1.949 *** Pj/Pi .683 1.316 X 
Dij - 1.452 .663 X 
c .0534 .003 
Syria .75 
Yj/Yi 2.115 3.858 * Pj/P1 .902 2.477 ** Dij 1.268 1.196 
c -19.45 2.599 
Lebanon .678 
Yj/Yi .339 .30 
Pj/Pi 1.329 1. 737 X 
Dij 5.83 2.39 X 
c -44.74 2.6 
North Yemen . 85 
Yj/Yi .628 • 691 X 
Pj/Pi 2.251 3.934 *** 
Dij 1.94 1.17 X 
c -17.54 1.349 
South Yemen .69 
Yj/Yi .8968 .802 X 
Pj/Pi 1.026 1.489 X 
D ij 1.442 .579 X 
c -10.724 .54 X 








*significant level at 1% 
**significant level at 5% 
***significant level at 10% 

















OIL ATTRACTION MODEL--RESULTS OF 
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OF LRAS 
Dependent Variable: Mij /Pi 
Independent Estimated Absolute 
R2 
Significance 
Country Variable Coefficient t-Ratio Level 
Jordan .846 
OR 1.60 4.54 * 
Pj/Pi .64 2.5 ** 
Dij .80 • 91 
c -13.95 1.8 
Egypt .51 
OR 1.01 1.57 
Pj/Pi .31 .70 
Dij - 1.62 .67 
c - 6.14 .30 
Lebanon .675 
OR .18 .20 
Pj/Pi 1.40 2.09 *** 
Dij 6.15 2.47 ** 
c -48.97 2.34 
Syria .64 
OR 1.56 2.97 
Pj/Pi • 54 1.40 
Dij 1.50 1.16 
c -32.61 2.90 
North Yemen .85 
OR .60 .80 
P.j/Pi 1.17 2.60 ** 
Dij 2.22 1.26 
c -23.35 1.37 
South Yemen .65 
OR .12 .12 
Pj/Pi 1.31 1.37 
Dij 2.14 1.37 
c -17.39 .65 
*significant level at 1% 
**significant level at 5% 
***significant level at 10% 
Country 
Sudan 
TABLE XVI (Continued) 
Independent Estimated Absolute 

















the total labor migrant, and not by the total population. 
Estimation of the Supply of Labor 
Immigrants into ORAS Group and 
Individual ORAS 
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This section presents an estimate of the supply of labor immigrants 
from LRAS into the ORAS, in two forms. First, an estimate of supply of 
immigrants in ORAS as a group, and secondly, into individual labor im-
porting states. The purpose of these estimates is to analyze the de-
terminants of labor immigration into these countries as a group and as 
individual states. 
The variables which are used in these estimates are the same varia-
bles which are used to estimate the labor emigration determinants from 
LRAS to ORAS. However, the form of migration flow and distance are now 
adjusted to Mji and Dji. The migration flows (Mji), now reflect the im-
migrants into county j, from the sending country i. And Dji, reflects 
the distance between the country of destination j and origin i. 
Table XVII contains the estimated relations for the ORAS as a group 
and for individual states. The table shows two estimates for the ORAS 
group. The first using the variables of income ratio, population ratio 
and distance, this is previously termed the investment in the "human 
capital model." The second using the same variables, except that oil 
revenues is substituted for the income ratio, this is previously termed 
the "oil attraction model." The estimates for the individual countries 
use only the simple version of the investments in the human capital mod-
el. The analysis of the estimated results begins with the ORAS group, 
followed by the individual results. 
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TABLE XVII 
THE ESTIMATED PARAMETERS FOR 
THE ORAS GROUP 
Dependent Variable: Mji/Pi 
Form of Equation: Log Linear 
Observations: 63 for the GroUEi 7 for Individual Countries 
Country Independent Estimated Absolute R2 
Significance 
Variable Coefficient t-Ratio Level 
Group .549 
Yj/Yi 1.066 5.904 * 
Pj/Pi .8413 7. 33 . * 
Dji - 1.039 2.414 ** 
c 5.345 1.711 
Group .41 
OR .7434 3.61 * 
Pj/Pi .3012 2.399 ** 
Dji .84 1.63 *** 
c .36 .08 
Saudi Arabia .722 
Yj/Yi .6003 .5449 X 
Pj/Pi 1.161 2.555 *** 
Dji - 2.284 .604 X 
c 15.805 .578 
Libya Yj/Yi 1.304 2.573 .875 *** 
Pj/Pi .417 1.8i1 X 
Dji - 4.141 4.323 ** 
c 28.153 4.522 
UAE .69 
Yj/Yi .32 .36 X 
Pj/Pi .71 .88 X 
Dji - 1.89 .42 X 
c 16.12 .49 
Qatar .62 
Yj/Yi • 277 .30 X 
Pj/Pi .925 1.28 X 
Dji - 1.52 .35 X 
c 11.33 .38 
Bahrain • 93 
Yj/Yi 1.65 4.78 * 
Pj/Pi .95 3.89 ** 
Dji - 1.43 1.14 X 
c 6.82 .82 
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TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Independent Estimated Absolute 
R2 
Significance 
Country Variable Coefficient t-Ratio Level 
Oman .60 
Yj/Yi .66 .54 X 
Pj/Pi .84 .94 X 
Dji - 1.38 .26 X 
c 11.51 .30 
Iraq .58 
Yj/Yi 2.70 1.10 X 
Pj/Pi 1.4 1.97 X 
Dji - 2.96 1.02 X 
c 14.49 .86 
Algeria .63 
Yj/Yi - 1.30 .• 82 X 
Pj/Pi .09 .11 X 
Dji 6.89 1.51 X 
c -52.8 1.59 
Kuwait .809 
Yj/Yi 1.53 1.35 
Pj/Pi .80 1.80 
Dji - 7.62 2.42 *** 
c 48.79 2.62 
*significant level at 1% 
**significant level at 5% 
***significant level at 10% 
X-not significant at 10% 
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The two estimates for ORAS show that income and population ratios, 
oil revenues, and distance are important determinants of labor immigra-
tion into ORAS. This is reflected in the significance levels of these 
variables, and the explanatory power of the independent variables of 
migration variation. However, the investment in the "human capital 
model" shows better results than the "oil attraction model." The inde-
pendent variables explain 54 percent of the change in migration in the 
first model, as against 41 percent in the second model. Also, though, 
income and population ratios, in both models are positively affecting 
migration, they differ markedly in their estimated elasticities. For 
example, the income ratio elasticity is higher than the oil elasticity. 
The estimated elasticities for these variables suggest that an increase 
in income ratio or oil revenues, by ten percent, cetris paribus, would 
increase migration by 10.6 percent in the first model, against 7.4 per-
cent in the second model. This result sould be interpreted that labor 
immigration between the two groups in the Arab world is more responsive 
to income differences, than the mere existence of oil wealth. 
Population ratio in both models, also reflect a positive effect on 
migration, but the elasticity in the first model is .greater than the 
second model. Distance in both models, seems to affect n~gatively the 
migration between the two groups. The negative distance elasticity sug-
gests that more migrants prefer to travel to nearer states than to far 
away states. 
The results of supply of immigrants of individual countries show in 
general, that income and population differentials and distance have the 
expected signs in the supply function of immigrants, though, statistical-
ly insignificant. This is shown in the correct sign of these variables 
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and their high explanatory power of the changes in the migration rate. 
For example, the variables on the average explain about 72 percent of 
the migration rate variations, with a range between the lowest and 
highest explanatory power from 58 percent to 93 percent. The income 
differentials variable has a positive effect on migration as expected 
for six countries, but with a wrong sign for three countries, namely 
Algeria, Oman, and the UAE. Population ratio has also the correct·sign 
for eight countries, and a wrong sign for only Algeria. Distance on 
the other hand, reflects an expected negative elasticity for eight coun-
tries, and a wrong sign for Algeria. 
The Displacement of Palestinians and Mobility 
A result of the creation of Israel in 1948 was the displacement of 
approximately one million Palestinians from their homes, and more impor-
tant, the land which represented their major economic base. 12 The rna-
jority of the refugees had found resettlement in Jordan and the Gaza. 
Strip. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War caused more Jordanians and Palestinians 
to relocate in the East Bank of Jordan. Estimates put their figure 
around 182,000 to 200,000. 13 The majority of the 1967 group were those 
who lived on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of Jordan. 
It can be hypothesized that these two major incidents are respon-
sible both directly and indirectly for the large number of labor mi-
grants from the Jordanians and Palestinians to the ORAS group. The 
12 
Keesing'e Contemporary Archives, July 9-16, 1949 (London, 1949), 
P. 1010. 
13 . Europa Publications, The Middle East and North Africa 1969/70 
(London, 1970), p. 93. 
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direct effect results from the creation of a great number of unemployed 
as a result of the displacements coupled with the inability of the Jor-
danian economy to absorb all of them. This made it imperative for many 
to look for jobs elsewhere, particularly in the ORAS region. The in-
direct effect is a result of the loss of their capital and land proper-
ties, which made the Palestinians more aware of the importance of devel-
oping their human resources by seeking versatile education, and selec-
ting mobile educationally based professions. Such investments in human 
capital, enable them to acquire and hold gainful employment in Jordan 
or elsewhere because of the exportability of human capital. 
The Jordanians and the Palestinians account for about 23 percent 
of t;he total labor migrants in the ORAS group. This is the third lar-
gest proportion among all the Arab labor migrants for individual coun-
tries. Table XVIII shows that Egypt comes first, with 33.9 percent fol-
lowed by North Yemen with 25.1 percent. However, the Jordanians and 
Palestinians rank first in terms of migration rate. Table XVIII shows 
that the migration rate for Jordanians and Palestinians is 98.5 thous-
ands per million of population. The second rank is far behind with 
only 54 thousand per million, and it is for North Yemen. Egypt and 
Sudan who rank at the top in to.tal population with first and second 
respectively, rank at the bottom with respect to migration rate, hold-
ing the sixth and seventh places respectively. 
The above analys·is shows that Jordan 1 s (including Palestine 1 s) mi-
gration rate per population comes first in rank, and this would suggest 
the inclusion of a dummy variable to test the hypothesis whether the 
presence of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the displacement of Pales-










DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARAB LABOR MIGRANTS 
IN THE ORAS GROUP AND RELATIVE SHARE 
IN PERCENT AND RATE PER MILLION 
Total(OOO) Percent Population 
Migrants % Million 
266 22.9 2.7 
392.2 33.9 37.2 
52.6 4.5 7.4 
41.0 3.5 3. 1 
190.7 25.1 5.3 
70.6 6.19 1.7 












The following migration function is specified to test such a hypo-
thesis: 
where: 
Dum = 1 
Dum = 0 
Presence of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and displacement of Palestinians to 
Jordan (when Pi stands for Jordan). 
Otherwise 
In the above migration b5 , the coefficient of the population (Pi), 
in the absence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, would represent the origin 
population effect on migration. While in the presence of this conflict, 
the sum of the coefficients b5 and b6 , of the origin population, would 
represent this effect for Jordan. Furthermore, it is expected that the 
coefficient bh be positive, and hence, it would result in;a greater Jor-
danian mobility as a result of the advanced hypothesis. 
The result of the estimated parameters of the above relationship is 
reported below: 
* * * *** * 
Mij = -11.05 + 1.51Yj - .36Yi - .99Dij + .80Pj + .29Pi + .15PiDum 
Abs·olute (2. 9) (7. 3) 
t-ratio 
(1.35) (2.5) 
*Significant at one percent level. 
***Significant at ten percent level. 
(6.14) (1.77) (2.7) 
The inclusion in the above model of a dummy variable, has increased 
the explanatory power of the independent variables considerably. This 
explanatory power is 62 percent, a 12 percent to 14 percent better than 
the explanatory power of the oil and income models or the investment in 
the human capital model (see Table XII). 
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Furthermore, the result in the above model is clearly consistent 
with the hypothesis that the existence of the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the resultant displacement of Palestinians from their land and the loss 
of their income base, had contributed to their increased mobility. The 
coefficient of the dummy variable has a positive sign as expected and is 
significant at a one percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient 
of the dummy variable in presence of the Palestinian problem is .156, 
and this increases the response of the population mobility for the Jor-
danians from .29 to about .45. This is a considerable increase in the 
original response and 34 percent of the total effect of population on mi-
gration. For example, the results suggest that a ten percent increase 
in the population of the origin would have an effect of 4.5 percent in-
crease in migration flow; while in absence of the conflict it would only 
increase by 2.9 percent. 
The inclusion of the dummy variable in the above migration function 
is formulated on the assumption that the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
displacement of the Palestinians has altered their marginal propensi-
ty to migrate. However, another formulation of the dummy variable, is 
made below. This formulation is based on the hypothesis that the displa-
cement of the Palestinians (the majority resettled in Jordan) has affect-
ed the average propensity of the Jordanian migration (altered the intercept 
of the migration function). For testing this hypothesis, a dummy vari-
able which has a value of 1 = Jordan; and 0 = Otherwise, is added to the 
migration function. 
The results, testing this hypothesis, are reported below: 
* * ** Mij = -11.05 + 1.23Dum + l.SlYj - .36Yi - .99Dij + 




*** + .29Pi 
.. (1. 77) 
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The above results show that the coefficient of the dummy variable 
is significant at the one percent level and positive. This means that 
the result supports the hypothesis that the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the displacement of the Palestinians had contributed to their observed 
mobility. 
Oil Revenues and the Pattern of 
Labor Migration 
A hypothesis can be advanced that oil revenues accruing to ORAS 
could explain the observed pattern of labor migration frotn the LRAS 
to ORAS. The explicit assumption is that oil revenues approximate the 
domestic labor absorbtive capacity for.ORAS group as the maximum level 
of goyernment expenditure consistent with government objectives and 
subject to the constraints of oil revenues. Immigration of labor would 
then occur to augment the en:digenous labor force required to carry the 
development plans in the ORAS group. The analysis then wbuld suggest 
that the more the oil revenues in the ORAS, the more the immigration ·of 
labor would be, and the less the oil revenues the less tbe immigration 
of labor would be. 
A migration function relating the migration flows to oil revenues 
and distance is estimated below. Distance is included in the model to 
account for total cost which could ~ffect the decision of'migrants in 
their choice of destination. The results appear in Table XIX which 










DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Mij 
OBSERVATIONS: 63 
Independent Estimated Absolute 
Variable Coefficient t-Ratio 
Log-Linear 
OR .9285 5.73 
Dij - 1.0026 2.2537 
c .4655 .1235 
Linear Form 
Observations: 9 
OR .0072 7.37 
Dij .002 .116 
c -!9.66 .841 
OR .0014 • 293 
Dij .063 .58 
c 109.02 .76 
OR .0005 1.56 
Dij .0007 .119 
c 3.188 • 399 
OR .00079 7.298 
Dij .00099 .472 
c .5118 .183 
OR .0114 7.345 
D ij .0088 .556 
c 30.911 1.107 
OR .00219 7.898 
Dij .00258' .887 


































*significant level at 1% 
X-not significant at 10% 
C stands for the Constant. 


















each individual country in the group. 
The estimated results of the model for both LRAS group and the 
individual country seem to support the hypothesis that oil revenues ex-
plain well the observed pattern of migration between the LRAS and ORAS. 
At the country level, a linear form of the model was fitted. Oil 
revenues coefficient has the expected sign, and is highly significant 
at better than the one percent level for five countries out of seven. 
Only for Egypt and Syria did the oil variable fail to be significant 
at a ten percent level, although it has the expected sign. 
Distance in this model does not seem to be important for individual 
countries' ·emigrants • It is insignificant for all and has a wrong sign 
for Jordan, North Yemen, and Sudan. 
At the group level however, both oil revenues apd distance are 
two important variables and explain about 46 percent of migration flows, 
and both variables are significant at a one percent level. Oil elasti-
city of migration flow is positive .928. A ten percent increase in the 
oil revenues will bring about a 9.3 percent increase in migration flows 
from the LRAS group. However, distance is inversely related to migra-
tion. This is compatible with two different interpretations. The first 
could be that the nearer the ORAS countries to the LRAS, the greater 
their labor absorbative capacity, and the greater the immigration to 
them. The second is that migrants prefer to travel to the nearer states 
than to the farther states. This behavior could reflect that cost of 
migration and adjustment are greater the longer the distance traveled, 
and/or that information decreases appreciably the longer the distance. 
Also, better information canbe obtained the nearer the states. If 
this is the case, then a policy to increase information about the 
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distant states from LRAS, or a subsidized travel cost would greatly 
enhance the mobility of labor in the region, especially in those coun-
tries which suffer from high unemployment or underemployment. 
CHAPTER V 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE LABOR EMIGRATION FOR 
THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY 
In order to analyze the effects of the labor migration on the Jor~ 
danian economy, a macro-model is designed to analyze the effects of 
workers' remittances on the macro-economic variables. Specifically the 
objective of the macro-model is three-fold: (1) to investigate the im-
pact of remittances on the Jordanian Nation~! Income and the Balance of 
Payments; (2) to analyze the effects of changing cil:'cumstances in the 
level of remittances on the Jordanian economy; and (3) to analyze alter-
native policy targets such as controlling emigration or encouraging it. 
A Macro-model for the Jordanian Economy 
The model utili.zes the Keynesian framework for the determination of 
income. It is a simple demand-oriented model designed to estimate the 
various multipliers including the multipliers for remittances, govern-
ment expenditure, foreign aid, exports and imports. 
The variables, the parameters, and the equations of the model are 
defined as follows: 
Endogenous Variables 
C Total private consumption expenditure 
I Total investment expenditure 
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M Total imports of goods and services 
GNI Gross National Income net of foreign aid 
Y Gross national income 
B Balance on current account {Basic Balance) 
Exogenous Variables 
G Total government expenditure 
x Total exports of goods and services 
R Remittance of workers abroad 
F Foreign aid 
Parameters 
c Autonomous consumption 
0 
c Marginal propensity to consume {mpc) . 
m Autonomomous imports 
0 
m Marginal propensity to import (mpm) 
i . Autonomous investment 
0 
i Marginal propensity to invest (mpi) 
e Disturbance term 
Equations and Identities 
(1) c = c 
0 
+ c(GNI) + e 
{Z) Ma m +mY + e 
0 
(3) I .. i + iY + e 
0 
(4) GNI "' y - F 
{S) y .. c + I + G + X+R+F-M 
(6) B = X+R+F M 
The National Income Multipliers 
(7) ay = ()y = ay = ay = 1 
ClG 3R ax a;;:- 1 - c -
0 
(8) ay = 1 - c 
aF 1 - c -i+m 
(9) ay - 1 
3m 1 - c-i+m 
0 










aB = 3B = ·1 - c - i 
ax ClR 1 - c - 1 + m 
oB = ~1 - c - i} 
3m 1 - c - i + m 
0 
aB = 1 - c - i +me 
ClF 1 - c - i + m 
Form Equations 
c = f(G, X, R, F, e) 
M = HG, X, R, F, e) 
I = f(G, X, R, F, e) 
y = f(G, X, R, F, e) 
B = f(G, X, R, F, e) 
i+m 
The Reduced Form Equations: Matrix Form 




0 0 1 0 0 -c 
-m 0 0 1 0 0 
-i 0 0 0 1 0 
A = 
-1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 -1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 
y c + e 
0 
B m + e 
0 
c i + e 






z = A-lD 
Model Variables and SEecifications 
The above macro-model includes six equations. The first three equa-
tions are the structural equations or behavioral equations, and corres-
pond to consumption, investment, and imports. The other three equations 
are merely identities for the national income net of foreign aid, gross 
national income (including foreign aid), and the Balance of Payments 
identity. The model has six endogenous variables, which appear on the 
left-hand side of the first six equations. They are consumption (C), 
investment (I), imports {M), Gross National Income net of foreign aid 
(GNI), total gross national income (Y), and·Balance of Payments (B). 
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In addition, the model has four exogenous variables, namely, government 
expenditure (G), workers' remittances (R), foreign aid (F), and exports 
(X). 
Equation (1) states that private consumption is a function of au-
tonomous consumption and gross national income (GNI). This is basically 
the Keynesian consumption hypothesis, which maintains that consumption 
is a function of the absolute level of personal disposable income. How-
ever, the use of gross national income in this model instead of the dis-
posable income, was based on the fact that taxes in the Jordanian econ-
omy are mostly indirect taxes, not income taxes. This formulation 
produces a lower marginal propensity to consume (mpc), than an estimat-
ed (mpc) based on disposable income. 
Equation (2) represents total imports for both private and public 
uses as a direct function of total aggregate income. Underlying this 
hypothesis is the proposition that the higher the size of aggregate in-
come the higher the imports, due to a higher level of aggregate demand. 
Investment function number (3) is also specified as a direct func-
tion of total aggregate national income (Y). The proposition here is 
that the higher the income the higher the incentive to invest. This is 
either due to a higher level of aggregate demand or due .to a high rate 
of profit associated with a high level of income. 
Equations (4) and (5) are identities for gross national income 
without and with foreign aid respectively. Equation (6) represents the 
balance of payments identity, where exports and imports include goods 
and services, The national income multiplier for government and auton-
omous expenditures, remittanc~s and exports, are represented by equa-
tion (7). They are all equal and expected to be positiv~. The 
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autonomous import multiplier is represented by equation (9), and it is 
equal to the multiplier in equation (7), but with a negative magnitude. 
The foreign aid multiplier equation (8), is shown to be less than 
the value of the remittances multiplier. This is primarily due to the 
fact that the remittances are direct transfer to the households and 
hence enter the consumption function, while foreign aid is a direct 
transfer to the government, which is exogenous in the model. 
The balance of payments multipliers with respect to exports and re-
mittances, are shown to be equal in equation (10). However, the balance 
of payments multiplier with respect to foreign aid equation (12) is 
shown to be greater than the multiplier with respect to exports or re-
mittances. If the marginal propensity to import is equal to zero, then 
the balance of payments multipliers with respect to exports, remittances, 
and for·eign aid would be equal and each would have a value of one, 
while the autonomous imports multiplier would be negative one. However, 
the higher the marginal propensity to import, the lower the value of 
the multipliers would be. 
The reduced form equations are simply the endogenous variables as 
functions of the exogenous variables of the model and the error terms. 
The reduced form equations not only have the advantage of estimating 
consistent structural coefficients, but they also can be used for fore-
casting economic phenomena. The coefficients of the exogenous variables 
in each equation of the reduced form of the model are the total effects 
of a change in the predetermined variables on the endogenous variable 
in the left-hand side of the equation after taking into account the 
interdependences among the endogenous variables. Also, the coefficients 
of the exogenous variables in this form could be interpreted as the 
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partial derivative of the endogenous variables with respect to the exo-
egnous variables given all other variables held constant. ,Therefore, 
we can say that a reduced form coefficient is either a multiplier or an 
impact multiplier. 1 For example, once the coefficients are estimated 
for the consumption equation (13), the value of the coefficient of re-
mittances would be the change of consumption due to a small change in 
remittances. 
Objectives of the Macro-Model 
Once the parameters of the models are estimated, it is possible to 
calculate the following: 
1. To calculate numerical values for the short-term multipliers 
of remittances, foreign aid, government expenditures, autono-
mous consumption, exports, and imports. 
2. To calculate numerical values for the short-term balance of 
payments multipliers of remittances, foreign aid, imports and 
exports. 
3. To evaluate alternative policy choices by comparing different 
policy actions. For example, if the government policy target 
is to get compensation from the labor importing_ countries for 
the loss of skilled workers, and on the assumption that the 
policy was successful in obtaining such compensation, what 
would be the outcome of such policy if the increase in compen-
sation received was offset by a reduction in foreign aid? 
1 
Teh-wei Hu, Econometrics: An Introductory Analysis (Baltimore, 
1973), p. 50. 
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4. To evaluate the impact of workers' remittances and foreign aid 
on consumption, investment, imports, national income, and the 
Balan.ce of Payments. This evaluation would be possible by ex-
amining the estimated coefficients of the reduced form equa-
tions. 
Model Estimation and Analysis 
The model equations are estimated using the annual time series data 
for Jordan (East Bank) for the period 1967 to 1977, and for Jordan (East 
and West Bank) for the period 1960 to 1977. All the variables are mea-
sured in millions of Jordanian dinars. The structural equations of the 
model of comsumption, investment and imports were estimated using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method and the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) method. It is realized, however, that the (OLS) is not a desir-
able method to apply for estimating simultaneous models. The interac-
tion of interdependent endogenous variables on each other is not taken 
into consideration when the (OLS) method is used, and hence, the esti-
2 mated coefficients would be inconsistent. Two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) provides, however, consistent estimates of structural coeffi-
cients, particularly when the equations are overidentififed. An equa-
tion is said to be overidentified, when the number of excluded endo-
genous variables from the equation is greater than the included number 
3 of endogenous variables in the same equation. 
2 R. S. Pi:ndyck and S. Rubinfeld, Econometric Models and Economic 
Forecasts (New York, 1976), p. 153. 
3 Ibid., p. 139. 
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The esti.mated coefficients of consumption, investment and imports 
of Jordan (East Bank) appear in Table XX. Both (OLS) and (2SLS) esti-
mation are reported. It is interesting to note that both methods give 
almost identical parameters. All the estimated coefficients are signi-
ficant at a one percent level, and the explanatory power o£ the indepen-
dent variable in each equation is very high (97 percent or higher). In 
the consumption function, the estimated marginal propensity to consume · 
is .588, using the (2SLS) method, and it is .592, using the (OLS) meth-
od. Both methods show that gross national income is an important deter-
minant of consumption and explains 97.7 percent of the variation in con-
sumption. The size of the (MPC) is, however, smaller than the estimates 
for other countries. As an example, the estimated (MPC) for the United 
State·s is • 89 for the period 1929 ·to 1976. 4 Art estimation of the con-
sumption function for Jordan (West Bank, and East Bank) for the period 
1955 to 1975 using a different specification (consumption as a function 
of all past incomes), shows that the short run (MPC) to be .44 and the 
implied long run (MPC) to be .77. 5 
The estimated consumption function for Jordan (East Bank), implies 
the following saving function: 
S = - 38.67 + .422 GNI 
Where S is saving and GNI is Gross National Income. 
Since taxes are not included as a separate function in the model, 
saving also includes the taxes. Hence, the high (MPS) .422 is the 
4 E. J. Shapiro, Macroeconomic Analysis (New York, 1978), p. 127. 
5 Adeeb K. Haddad, "An Econometric Monetary Model of the Jo~danian 
Economy" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1979), 
p. 84. 
Dependent Variable 
(1.0) Consumption (C) 
(2.0) Imports (M) 
(3.0) Investment (I) 
(1.1) Consumption (C) 
(2.1) Imports (M) 
(3.1) Investment (I) 
TABLE XX 
ESTIMATED CONSUMPTION IMPORTS AND INVESTI!ENT 








































































total leakages of saving and taxes out of the change in gross national 
income, not only the propensity to save. 
Estimated equation of imports shows that the marginal propensity 
to import is .835 and significant at a one percent level, using the 
(2SLS) method. The correlation coefficient is .998. In other meanings, 
income explains 99.8 percent of the imports variation. The (MPM) means 
that ten million Jordanian dinars in income would increase imports by 
8.35 million. The size of the (MPM) is rather high relative to other 
countries. For example, the (MPM) of the United States is .073, for 
the United Kingdom and for Sweden it is .31, for Japan it is .34, and 
for India it is .10. 6 
The marginal propensity to import shows the extent to which changes 
' 
in income cause changes in imports. An increase in income would cause 
changes in imports. An increase in income would cause an increase in 
imports, and thus worsening the balance of trade rather than adding to 
the do~estic multiplier process by becoming a further new demand for 
domestic goods and services. 
The investment function shows that the estimated marginal propen-
sity to invest (MPI) out of total national income is .30. Unlike the 
(MPM) the (MPI) would increase the multiplier value, the higher the 
(MPI) ,the higher would be the value of the multiplier. 
6 . . 
C. P. Kindleberger and P. H. Lindert, International Economics 
(Homewood, 1978), p. 300. 
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The Impact of Workers' Remittances on National 
Income and the Balance of Payments of 
Jordan (East Bank) 
Utilizing the estimated propensities of consumption, imports and 
investment, a numerical value of the workers' remittances multiplier and 
other expenditures multiplier are calculated. The results are reported 
in equations 7.1 to 12.1 below: 
(7.1) ClY "' ClY .. ClY • ClY • 1.05 
ClR ClG ClX ac 
0 
(8.1) ay .. .435 
ClF 
(9.1) ;)y ,. -1.05 
amo 
(10.1) 3B = ;)B = .118 
ax aR 
(11.1) ClB c: -.118 
Clm 
0 
(12 .1) ClB ::: .635 
oF 
Equation (7.1) shows that the value of the workers' remittances 
multiplier is equal to 1.05. This value represents also the multiplier 
value of expenditures of government, exports, and autonomous consump-
tion. 
This result suggests that an increase in any of the above expendi-
tures, ceteris paribus, by ten million Jordanian Dinars (JD) would in-
crease total national income by 10.5 million (JD), while a similar de-
crease would cause income to decrease by 10.5 million (JD). 
The above values of the expenditure multipliers of Jordan (East 
Bank) compare well with reported multipliers of the advanced economies, 
such as of the United States, Belgium and Netherlands; despite the 
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simple econometric model used for Jordan, as compared with the highly 
complex models of the other mentioned countries. For example, the 
first quarter expenditure impact multipliers of the United States range 
from a low 1.1 to a high 1.8, and the one year cumulative multipliers 
7 vary from 1.6 to 2.8. For Belgium and the Netherlands, the value of 
8 the government expenditure multipliers are 1.29 and 1.36 respectively. 
The policy implications of the above expenditure multiplier of 
Jordan suggests that control of emigration or imports has a direct ef-
feet on the national income. If a policy is imposed to cut down labor 
emigration, and subsequently the remittances fall down, the growth of 
income would be retarded by an amount equivalent to the product of the 
decrease of remittances multiplied by the value of the multiplier 
(1.05), while encouraging emigration would increase income by the 
above product. On the other hand, a policy to decrease the marginal 
propensity to import would enhance the increase in the value of the 
multiplier and contribute a direct effect on the increase in income as 
a result of a change in various expenditures. 
It is appropriate when discussing the impact of workers' remit-
tances to point out that both reported and unreported remittances (ac-
tual) should be taken into account, especially if the latter are con-
siderable. Since the reported remittances, only, are considered here, 
taking into account the unreported remittances as well, would show 
greater effect on the national income or the Balance of Payments. 
7 Allan S. Blinder, et al., The Economics of Public Finance (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1974), p. 77. 
8 Albert E. Ando, et al., Studies in Economic Stabilization (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1968), p. 191. 
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Equation (8.1) shows the autonomous import multiplier, and it is 
equivalent to negative 1.05. A policy aimed to decrease imports by ten 
million (JD) would increase income by 10.5 million (JD), while a similar 
policy to increase imports by ten million (JD) would contribute to a 
decrease income by 10.5 million (JD), ceteris paribus. 
Equation (9.1) shows the value of the multiplier of foreign aid to 
be .435. This rather low value means that an increase in foreign aid 
by ten million (JD) would only contribute to an increase in the national 
income by 4.35 million (JD). This low effect of foreign aid on national 
income, however, needs to be explained, The specification of the con-
sumption function in the model excluded the foreign aid from the total 
income, and considered it as part of transfers to government not to the 
household. Hence, the value of the multiplier for foreign aid is less, 
due to the loss of the incremental consumption out of foreign aid. Had 
the consumption been a linear function of total income (including for-
eign aid), the value of the multiplier of foreign aid would be higher 
and equivalent to the government expenditure multiplier. Taking into 
consideration that foreign aid is a direct transfer to government, the 
full effect of foreign aid on the national income should consider the 
impact of government expenditure on national income as well. This means 
that the correct effect of foreign aid on national income would be equi-
valent to the effect of government expenditure. Thus, an increase in 
foreign aid of ten million (JD) to the government budget would increase 
income by the product of the multiplier value of 1.05 multiplied by the 
increa~e in the government expenditure 10 million (JD) or an increase 
in income of 10.5 million (JD). 
Equations (10.1) to (12.1) show the Balance of ·Payments multipliers 
120 
with respect to remittances, exports, autonomous imports, and foreign 
aid. The results indicate that the foreign aid multiplier of Balances 
of Payments is about 5.4 times the multiplier of workers remittances. 
Thus, an increase of ten million (JD) in remittances would have a pos-
itive increase in the Balance of Payments of only 1.18 million, while a 
similar increase in the foreign aid would have a positive increase in 
the Balance of Payments of 6.35 million (JD). Similarly, an increase 
in the autonomous imports of ten million (JD) would have a negative ef-
fect on the Ba1ance of Payments of only 1.18. 
The policy implications of the. estimated multipliers indicate that 
the foreign aid has a larger favorable effect on the balance of pay-
ments than the workers' remittances or exports. On the other hand, if 
the marginal propensity to import were to be zero, the effects of for-
eign aid, remittances and exports on the Balance of Payments would be 
equal, and the multiplier value of each would be of magnitude one. 
wt).ile if it were the case that the added values of the marginal propen-
sity to consume (MPC) and the marginal propensity to invest (MPI) were 
equivalent to one, then the effect of exports or remittances on the 
Balance of Payments would be zero, while the foreign aidwould be posi-
tive; 
Since it is reasonable to assume that marginal propensity to con-
sume would not be zero, and more likely to remain positive, the findings 
indicate that the lower the marginal propensity to consume (the higher 
the marginal propensity to save), ceteris paribus, the higher would 
be the value of the multiplier of workers' remittances, and the greater 
their effect on the Balance of Paymertts; while the higher the ~rginal 
propensity to consume (the lower the marginal p'ropensity to save), the 
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lower the value of the multiplier, and the lower the effect of remit-
tances on the Balance of Payments. 
Thus, to have a positive effect on the Balance of Payments various 
policies could be directed to either lower the (MPC) and encourage sav-
ings, or to cut down on imports and encourage substitution of domesti-
cally produced goods for imports. 
Thus far the results of the multiplier analysis indicate that work-
.ers' remittances are found to have a direct impact on the national in-
come and the Balance of Payments. Foreign aid is found to have a sim-
ilar effect. 
Further evidence on the economic effects of workers' remittances 
on national income and its main components could be obtained utilizing 
the estimated results of the reduced form equations. The advantage of 
using the reduced equations coefficients is to find the impact of work-
ers' remittances in income, investment, or imports, taking into account 
the interdependences among these variables. Thes estimated equations 
of the reduced form equations appear in Table XXI. 
Equations (13.1) to (17.1) show that the coefficient of workers' 
remittances is positive in the equations of imports, investment, income, 
and'Balance of Payments, but the results are statistically insignificant 
and also show an unexpected negative sign in the consumption equation. 
Similarly, foreign aid has a positive effect on imports, income, 
and the balance of payments. Only the coefficient of the balance of 
payments is significant at a ten percent level. Also, foreign aid 
shows unexpected negative effects on consumption and investment, but 
is statistically insignificartt. Exports on the other hand, show a 
positive effect on imports, investment, and income, with a statistically 
TABLE XXI 
ESTIMATED EQUATIONS OF THE 
REDUCED FORM MODEL 
JORDAN (EAST BANK) 
(13.1) C = 98.30 - .42 R- .20F + .53G + 1.28X 
t2ratio (1.86) (-.53) (-.37) (.59) (1.55) 
R = .96 
DW = 1.44 
(14.1) M = 4.67 + .21R + .28F + .47G + 1.56X 
t 2ratio (.14) (.45) (.86) (.86) (3.12)** 
R = .995 
DW=l.67 
(15.1) I = 41.11 + .08R- .23F - .42G + 1.03X 
t2ratio. (1.73) (.23) (.95)(-1.03) (2.7)** 
R = . 98 
DW = 2.06 
(16.1) Y = 134.7 + .43R + .28F + .63G + 1.75X 
t 2ratio (3.32)(~71) (.68) (.91) (2.9)** 
R = .99 
DW = 1.47 
(17~1) B = -4.67 + .78R + .71F- .47G- .56X 
t2ratio (-.14)(1.6) (2.19)**(-.86)(1.12) 
R = .62 
DW = 1.64 
**Significant at five percent. 
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significant coefficient at the five percent level. The results indi-
cate that a one million (JD) increase in exports would cause an increase 
in imports of 1.56 million (JD), 1.75 million in income, and 1.03 mil-
lion in investments. 
Model Estimated Equations: Jordan 
(East Bank and West Bank) 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the model is estimated using 
two sets of data. The preceding analysis was conducted on estimated 
relations utilizing data of Jordan (East Bank) for the 1967 - 1977 
period. The present analysis is concerned with estimated relations of 
Jordan (East Bank and West Bank), and utilizing data for the period of 
1960 to 1977. 
Table XXII contains the estimated structural equations of the mod-
el, together with the numerical calculations of the various multipliers. 
In the table, equations (1.2) to (3.2) show the results of the estimat-
ed equations of consumption, imports, and investment. The equations 
were estimated using the OLS method. Although the OLS method is gen-
erally not applicable to simultaneous equation models, in some situa-
tions OLS does as well as 2SLS. 
. 2 
For example, if the R values in the 
reduced-form regression (that is, stage 1 regressions) are very high, 
in excess of .8, the classical OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates will 
9 be very close. 
The coefficients of the equations (1.2) to (3.2) are all signifi-
cant at a one percent level or better, and the explanatory power of the 
9 Damodar Gujarati, Basic Econometrics (New York, 1978), p. 379. 
TABLE XXII 
ESTIMATED STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS, NATIONAL INCOME 
AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MULTIPLIERS 
JORDAN (EAST BANK AND WEST BANK)a 
c = 15.80 
(2.99) 




R = .992 DW 3.31 
(2. 2) 
t-ratio 
R2 = .996 DW .97 
(3.2) 
t-ratio) 
R2 = .976 DW 1.86 
(7.2) ()y ,. ()y ,.. ()Y 
ac aR ax 
(8.2) ay .. .3875 
()F 
(9.2) 3Y ... -1'.24 
am 
0 
= ()Y "" ac 
0 
(10.2) ()B .,. dB "" .lOSS 
()R ax 
(11. 2) ClB .. -.1055 
am 
0 
(12. 2) oB .. .719 
()F 
M = -84.17 
(-7.22) 
I • -17.65 
(-4. 79) 
1. 24 
+ . 72Y 
(25.7) 




"Chow Test" was applied to see if the estimated coefficients of 
consumption, imports and investment of Jordan (East/West Bank) are not 
statistically significant from the respective coefficients of Jordan 
(East Bank); and the conclusion of the test was the rejection of the 
null hypothesis (equality of the coefficients) for investment and im-
ports, but accepting it for consumption. This suggests that a struc-
tural shift has occurred in the functions of investment and imports but 
not the consumption of Jordan since 1967. 
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independent variables are very high, 97 percent or higher. The esti-
mated propensities of consumption, imports and investment are .688, .72, 
and .227 respectively. These propensities are greatly different in 
contrast to the earlier Jordan (East Bank) propensities. For example, 
the respective propensities of Jordan (East Bank) are .588, .83, and 
.30. This contrast shows that the (MPC) of Jordan (East Bank) is far 
below the (MPC) of Jordan (East/West Banks). This could perhaps indi-
cate that consumption behavior could have changed in the East Bank, 
since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. On the other hand, the lower (MPC) of 
the East Bank, could be attributed to higher transfers of income from 
the households of the East Bank to those inside the West Bank. What-
ever the explanation of the lower (MPC) of Jordan (East Bank), would be, 
this contrast shows that households in the East Bank are saving more of 
their sincome since 1967. 
Similar comparison of the import and investment propensities show 
that the Jordan (East Bank) propensities are higher than the estimated 
results of Jordan (East Bank/West Bank). This also could be perhaps 
considered as an upward shift in these propensities, especially as a 
result of the influx of refugees from the West Bank since 1967. 
The above estimated propensities were used to calculate the mul-
tipliers of various expenditures and the Balance of Payments multipli-
ers. The results are shown in equations (7.2) to (12.2). Equation 
(7.2) is the multiplier of government expenditures which is equal to 
each of the multipliers of remittances, exports and autonomous con-
sumption. The value of this multiplier is 1.24. This means, for 
example, that workers' remittances have a positive effect on national 
income. An increase of ten million export expenditures, government, 
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and autonomousexpenditures, also have a similar and equivalent positive 
effect on income. 
Foreign aid and autonomous imports have opposite effects on the na-
tional income. This is shown in equations (8.2) and (9.2), which repre-
sent the multipliers of foreign aid and autonomous imports respectively. 
Foreign aid has a positive multiplier of .3875 in value, and autonomous 
imports have a negative multiplier of (-1.24). However, the argument 
forwarded earlier in this chapter, concerning the full. extent of foreign 
aid effect, should take into consideration the government expenditures 
effect on income as well, and is applicable here also. 
Equations (10.2), (11.2), and (12.2), represent the Balance of 
Payments multipliers with respect to remittances (which is equivalent 
to the multiplier of of exports); autonomous imports, and foreign aid 
respectively. Clearly, remittances and foreign aid have positive ef-
fects on the Balances of Payments, but the latter has greater positive 
effect (about seven times greater) than the remittances. Autonomous 
imports has a low effect on the Balance of Payments too, but opposite 
in sign to the remittances effect. 
Further evidence on the role and magnitude of workers' remittances 
effect on the national income, its main elements, and the Balance of 
Payments is given from the estimated results of the reduced-form equa-
tions. However, these results are based on a macro-model utilizing a 
slightly different specification of the structural equations of consump-
. 10 
tion, imports and investment of the earlier macro-model. The results 
10 The specifications of the structural equations are as follows: 
Caf(R, F,GDP,e), I•f(R,F1 ,GDP,e) and M•f(R,F,C,e), where all variables 
are as defined before, and F1 is foreign aid lagged one period, and GDP 
is Gross Domestic Product = Y-R-F. 
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of the estimated reduced-form equations appear in Table XXIII below. 
Equations (13.2) to (17.2) show that worker's remittances have a 
positive effect on consumption, investment, national income, and the 
balance of payments, but a negative effect on imports. However, the 
coefficient .of worker's remittances in these equations is only signifi-
cant at five percent and ten percent level in the income and Balance of 
Payments equation respectively, and insignificant in the others. 
In the income equation (16.2), the increase in workers' remittances 
by one million (JD), would cause an increase in income of 2.05 million 
in the national income. Similar increase in remittances would bring 
about an increase of 1.28 million (JD) in the balance of payments. 
Similarly, government expenditures and exports show a positive 
effect on consumption, imports, investment-and income, but a negative 
effect on the balance of payments. though the coefficient of exports 
is not significant in the balance of payment or in the investment equa-
tions. 
In summary, the multiplier analysis, and the reduced form estima-
tion show that remittances have a positive effect on the national in-
come and the balance of payments. 
The policy implications of these results suggest that control of 
migration or reduction of the remittances would result in a significant 
negative effect on the national income, and a mild effect on the Bal-
ance of Payments. 
(13.2) 
t 2ratio 




R = .9902 
(16.2) 
t 2 ratio 
R = .9981 
(17.2) 
TABLE XXIII 
ESTIMATED EQUATIONS OF THE REDUCED 
FORM MODEL JORDAN (EAST 
AND WEST BANK) 
C m 50.5 + .36R- .37F1- .01F + 1.74G + .64X 
(6.21)(.54)(-1.24) (-.05) (5.12)* (2.01*** 
M = 3.72- .28R + .11F1 + .07F + .57G + 1.56X 
(.49)(-.46) (+.41) (.23) (1.82)*** (5.26)* 
I = -4.65 + .43R + .23Fl - .20F + .60G + .13X 
(-.94)(1.07) (1.28) (-1.0) (2.94)**(.67) 
Y a 42.16 + 2.08R- .25F1 + .70F + 2.78G + .21X 
(4.47) (2.70)**(-.73)(1.80)***(7.04)* (.57) 
B = -3.72 + 1.28R- .11Fl -.92F- .57G- .56X 
(-.49)(2.09)***(-.41) (3.04)*(-1.82)*** (-.49) 
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----------------------------------
* Significant at one percent. 
** Significant at five percent. 
*** Significant at ten percent. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Summary 
The main objectives of this study as stated in this research were: 
1. To gain an empirical understanding of labor migration between 
two groups of the Arab countries. The first group is considered to be 
labor-rich, and referred to in this study as labor-rich Arab states 
(LRAS), and includes seven countries, namely, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Sudan, Syria, and the two Yemens (North Yemen and South Yemen). The 
second group is considered to be oil-rich, is referred to as oil-rich 
Arab states (ORAS), and includes nine countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United A~ab Emirates 
(UAE). 
2. To study the consequences of workers' remittance for the Jor-
danian economy, particularly their impact on the national income and the 
balance of payments. 
3. To derive policy implications for Jordan, the two Arab groups, 
and the region. 
Two analytical methods were utilized to satisfy the above objec-
tives: an econometric analysis to study the labor migration determi-
nants, and a macro-economic model of the Keynesian demand-oriented type 
designed to study the consequences of migration to the Jorranian economy. 
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With regard to the study of the determinants of migration, three 
migration functions were specified to explain the flow of labor migra-
tion from LRAS to ORAS. Oil revenue, income, and population at both 
origin and destination, and distance were used as explanatory variables 
in these functions. 
Utilizing pooled cross-sectional data of ORAS and LRAS for 1975, 
the relationships were then estimated in log-linear form for the LRAS 
group, the ORAS group, and for each country of the two groups. 
1be important findings and conclusions of the analysis of the 
results will immediately follow.this summary. 
With regard to the study of the consequences of workers' remit-
tances, a macro-economic model of six equations was specified to the 
Jordanian economy. This included three behavioral equations for con-
sumption, investment, and imports, and three identities for national 
income net of foreign aid, national income including foreign aid, and 
the balance of payments. 
The parameters of the model'were then estimated utilizing two sets 
of data: annual time series data for Jordan (East Bank) for the period 
1967 to 1977; and for Jordan (East/West Banks) for the period 1960 to 
1977. Model parameters were estimated by the ordinary least squares 
(OLS), and two-stage least squares (2SLS). Utilizing the multiplier 
analysis, the effects of workers' remittance and foreign aid on the 
national income and the balance of payments of Jordan were. then evalu-
ated. The results of the analysis and the findings are contained in 
the conclusions section below. 
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Conclusions 
The results and findings of the study of labor migration between 
Labor-rich Arab states (LRAS) and oil-rich Arab states (ORAS) indicate 
the following: 
1. Oil revenues and income at destination are important determi-
nants of migration between the two Arab groups. Both variables are 
found to have positive elasticities, indicating strong "pull" effect to 
labor migration. However, the income elasticity of migration is higher 
than the oil revenue elasticity, 1.67 as against 1.14. This indicates 
that innnigrants are more responsive to higher income (higher wages) 
than to the increases in the oil revenues. 
2. Both populations at origin and at destination are found to 
affect migration positively, indicating that countries of larger popu·· 
lations supply more migrants than countries with smaller populations; 
and these migrants are more attracted to larger populations at destina-
tion than to smaller populations. However, the origin population elas-
ticity is found to be less than one, indicating that migration increases 
less than in proportion to origin population. This is in contrast to 
the population at destination elasticity, which is found to be greater 
than one, indicating that migration increases more than in proportion 
to destination population. 
3. Distance is found to have a significant dampening effect on 
migration. The high negative elasticity of distance indicates that 
either costs (psychic or financial) or lack of information are important 
deterrants to migration between LRAS and ORAS. 
4. A hypothesis concerning the Palestinians' mobilitr was tested 
in this study. The results indicate that the continued Arab-Israeli 
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conflict, and the loss of the Palestinians' economic base, i.e., land, 
had contribHted to their increased mobility. 
With regard to the study of the consequences of workers' remit-
tances to the economy of Jordan, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Remittances have a significant impact on the national income, 
but a mild impact on the balance of payments. The results indicate that 
a 10 million (JD) increase in workers' remittances would increase the 
national income by 10.05 million (JD), but would affect the balance of 
payments by 1.18 million (JD) (reduce the deficit). 
2. In contrast to the impact of remittances, foreign aid was found 
to have a relatively smaller effect on national income, but greater 
effect on the balance of payments. An increase of 10 million (JD) of 
foreign aid would increase the national income by 4.35 million (JD), 
while it would affect favorably the balance of payments by 6.35 million 
(JD). 
This apparent discrepancy between the impact of remittances and 
foreign aid on national i.ncome and the balance of payments is due to 
the fact that remittances are direct transfers to the household income, 
and hence generate more income via the marginal propensity to consume, 
while foreign aid is a direct transfer to the government, and are not 
part of the household consumption. 
3. A structural shift tn the Jordanian economy seems to have 
occurred since the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. This conclusion could be 
drawn-when different marginal propensities for Jordan (East Bank) are 
compared to the marginal propensities of Jordan (East/West Banks). 
The marginal propensities of consumption, imports, and investment for 
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the East Bank are found to be .59, .84, and .30, respectively, and .69, 
.72, and .23 for Jordan (East/West Banks). 
Policy Implications of the Study 
The overall conclusion drawn from this research seems to support 
the theoretical implications of the classical theory of factor mobility. 
Apart from the social costs which migration may cause to the origin and 
to the destination countries, the present pattern of the migration flows 
between the labor-rich Arab States (LRAS) and the oil-rich,Arab states 
(ORAS) is in the right direction, and constitutes an efficient process 
of resource transfer and reallocation of labor from lower income states 
to the higher income states. 
If workers are to continue enhancing economic efficiency in the 
allocation of resources, they must be capable and willing to make the 
appropriate occupational, industrial, or geographic adjustment as die-
tated by changing economic conditions. The policymaker's task would 
be to stimulate the labor-force toward the desired direction, by manipu-
lating the factors that are most likely to influence the labor-force 
toward the desired labor-supply adjustment. 
The following recommendations for policy guidance and for further 
research are relevant. 
1. In general, policies to enhance the free labor mobility between 
the two Arab groups are desirable. Particularly, policies to increase 
information on distant labor markets, and to reduce labor movement costs 
would be useful. 
2. To enhance the favorable impact of remittances on,the Jordanian 
. 1., . 
national income and the balance of payments, continued policies to 
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increase the free flow of capital to Jordan coupled with policies to 
encourage import substitution industries are most desirable. 
3. Finally, for further research on determinants of migration for 
skills-specific labor markets, disaggregated data is most needed. Simi-
lar studies to the present one could then be conducted. It is recom-
mended, however, to include specific variables such as real wages, real 
costs, education level, or urbanization degree. Furthermore, simultan-
eous models which consider supply and demand of labor are recommended. 
The suggested disaggregated models could prove to be useful as a pol;i.cy 
guidance on matters of controlling or encouraging migration. 
Specifically, the following policy recommendations and guidelines 
for policy formulation seem to be relevant: 
1. Since the flow of Arab labor as this study has shown appears to 
be proceeding in the right direction, ways need to be developed to both 
regulate the flow of labor and properly stimulate and channel it. The 
states should be studying the following possible developments. 
a. For years now the Arabs have been discussing and planning Arab 
unity. If this finally proves feasible and is accomplished the whole 
Arab labor problem will transform itself from one of international labor 
migration to internal labor migration. In such an event labor migration 
will proceed in accordance with classical economic factors now applicable 
to internal labor migration without all the political problems which are 
a feature of international labor migration. 
h. There is also talk of an Arab economic union following the exam-
ple of the European Economic Union (the European Common Market). In 
fact. several steps have been taken in this direction. Under such a 
system the Arab states will probably agree to the free flow of labor 
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within the Arab economic union. As in the case in Europe now, the only 
restrictions are those relating to types and qualifications of the labor 
force allowed unrestricted migration within the states of the union. 
The Arab states should establish a special committee of experts to study 
the European model and conduct a feasibility study for possible applica-
tion in the Arab world. 
c. If the above two possibilities fail to materialize, or until 
such time as they materialize, the oil rich Arab states and the labor 
rich states can begin to negotiate either general and comprehensive 
agreements or bilateral agreements aiming at the most efficient regula-
tion of the flow of labor and all other policies pertaining to both the 
quality and efficiency of the labor involved. This could include poli-
cies aimed at increasing the flow of information to the distant labor 
markets and proper dissemination of such information. 
d. It seems that so many of the labor rich countries in the Arab 
world at present receive substantial financial subsidies and loans from 
the o.il rich states. In the language of policies, their action would 
require a guid pro quo arrangement, meaning that the states which are 
recipient of such subsidies and loans need to respond in kind to the 
needs of the countries supplying the subsidies and loans. An area where 
they can meet such a need is in the area of human resources. 
e. It must be remembered that labor immigration in the Arab world 
has become an established fact for years and it generates expectations 
which cannot easily be tampered with. Any attempt, therefore, by any 
of the countries involved to tamper·with this flow will lead to possible 
serious and dramatic political developments in inter-state' relationships. 
In addition, one should anticipate pressure, from interest groups in both 
136 
the receiving and sending countries to maintain the status quo, even 
if economic conditions call for a change in the status quo. Finally, 
any such action could be interpreted as proceeding against the senti-
ments and feelings of Arab solidarity and produce serious reprecussions 
across the Arab world. 
2. The labor sending states need to consider and fully study the 
following policy matters: 
a. If a decision to stop or curtail the flow of labor is not easy 
to take or accept for both economic and political con&iderations, the 
state should proceed with an in-depth study of the whole labor migration 
problem with the expressed aim of changing state laws to eliminate all 
possible injustices and inequities in the system. State procedures for 
exit, entry, customs, passports, permits, etc. must be reviewed and 
streamlined to insure an orderly operation that is essentially humane 
and just in its philosophy and approach. 
b. The state must commence thorough statistical studies of the 
labor market and labor flow. First, it must determine the essential 
needs of the state at present and in the future, and secondly, the 
impact of such labor egress on the overall econo~y of the state. On the 
strength of these studies the state should be in a position to develop 
an overall labor policy that takes into consideration what segments of 
the labor market are to be curtailed from emigration, in the national 
interest, and the total development of school and vocational training 
systems to cater to the established needs. Such studies might entail 
cooperation on these lines with the host countries. 
c. For Jordan, human resources are her most valuable resources 
1 
and source of wealth. Recognizing this fact requires that development 
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of labor become a central strategy in any development process for Jor-
dan. In the long run a policy goal should be to maintain a manpower 
demand-supply balance of the domestic market and the demand of the oil 
rich Arab states. 
This goal would require unilateral actions by Jordan, as well as 
bilateral or multilateral action by Jordan and the oil rich Arab states. 
On one hand Jordan, unilaterally, should aim to renovate her education 
system in a manner that is flexible to meet the manpower needs of the 
market. On the other hand, cooperation with the oil-rich Arab states 
to establish new vocational and technical colleges, training institutes, 
and universities, or expanding the existing institutions with the ob-
ject of sharing the output of these institutions, would constitute 
another step toward meeting the growing demand for labor. This coopera-
tion in manpower t.raining between Jordan and other labor-rich Arab 
states and the oil-rich states could prove to be a right step toward a 
common Arab labor market. 
In the short run, however, Jordan could overcome the shortage in 
labor force supply by several means. Important among these are: the 
encouragement of female and teenage work; introducing two-shift work; 
attracting back Jordanian emigrant labor; importing foreign labor; and, 
finally by the market adjustment of wages. 
3. The labor receiving states need to consider the following poli-
cy suggestions. 
a. They should periodically review and study in depth their labor 
laws and regulations to insure that the flow of labor is more stream-
lined and humane. The labor market has a great capacity <;~f passing 
around damaging information which could easily lead to lal)or avoiding 
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specific countries because of their laws or the way they treat the local 
migrant workers. 
b. They should be both open and explicit about their labor laws 
and share. them with the sending countries. Such exchanges should of 
necessity explain terms, benefits, etc. the migrant workers should ex-
pect to receive. One important recommendation is that the host coun-
tries should avoid the promulgation of laws and regulations of an ~ 
post facto nature, unless such laws increase the benefits of the labor 
force. In no way should such laws or regulations reduce benefits al-
ready allowed or provide restrictions not in force before the migrant 
laborers arrived in the country. 
c. The host states need to review some of the laws relating to 
migrant workers particularly in so far as they apply to ownership. Pres-
ent laws seem to be exceptionally strict in nature as they do not allow 
migrant workers to own immovable property. They should also reconsider 
their present laws dealing with the transfer of money outside the coun-
try and make them more favorable to migrant workers. 
d. The host states might find some benefit in changing their im-
migration laws to allow at least essential migrant workers to become 
legal immigrants and eventually acquire the citizenship of the host 
country. The U.S., faced with a similar problem, has continuously fol-
lowed the policy of accepting immigration. 
Finally one important factor to which all the states of the region 
should address themselves is: if the Arab-Israeli question is finally 
resolved, and the Arab armies are demobilized, what will this influx of 
such large numbers of able bodied persons do to the labor ~rket? 
While this might now appear to be years ahead, no state should allow 
future policy to develop by default for lack of preparation. 
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1 = Investment on Capital Formation 
GDP = Consumption + Government 
ports - Imports 
GNI = GDP + Remittances 
Consumption + Investment + Ex-
(4) Total GNY "" GNI + Foreign Aid 
(S) B = Exports + Remittances + Foreign Aid - Imports 
To/From 

















ARAB HIGRANT WORKERS FROH LRAS TO ORAS FOR 1975a 
Egypt Syria Lebanon North Yemen South Yemen Sudan Total 
1.0 .4 0 0 0 0 1.8 
1.2 .1 .1 1.1 1.1 .4 4.6 
7.0 .2 3.0 0 0 .2 15.4 
37.6 16.5 7.2 2.8 8.7 • 9 121.4 
229.5 13.0 5.7 0 0 7.0 269.4 
5.3 1.5 0 1.0 0 .2 10.6 
2.9 .8 .5 1.3 1.3 .4 13.2 
Saudi Arabia 175.0 95.0 15.0 20.0 280.0 55.0 35.0 675.0 
UAE 14.5 12.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 1.5 46.7 
Total 266 392.2 52.0 41.0 41.0 70.6 45.6 1158.1 
Sources: aJ. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration Project: A Summary of Provisional 
Findings (Durham, 1978), p. 13. 
bZafer H. Ecevit, International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa paper pre-
sented to the Rockefeller Foundation Conference on International Migration (Bellagio, Italy, 









Sandi Arabia 750 
UAE 1260 
TABLE XXV 
DISTANCES IN AIR MILES 
BETWEEN LRAS AND ORAS 
Egypt Syria Lebanon 
1620 1830 1770 
1200 979 1045 
780 450 480 
997 736 802 
1089 1351 1071 
1710 1500 1530 
1277 1066 1132 
769 840 882 
1500 1264 1329 
147 
North South 
Yemen. .. Yemen .Sudan 
2850 2970 2250 
859 1008 1638 
1230 1380 1410 
986 1150 1361 
2.190 2096 2340 
1080 1140 1740 
833 930 1399 
.533 712 597 
1091 914 1616 
Source: Cook's Travel Agency, Beirut. Distances between LRAS and 
Algeria, Iraq, and Oman are based on straigbtline distances 











LABOR-RICH ARAB STATES (LRAS) PER CAPITA 
INCOME, TOTAL POPULATION, ACTIVE 
POPULATION AND PARTICIPATION 
RATE FOR 1975 
Per Capita Total Active 
Income Population Population 
Dollars Million Million 
490 2.7 .754 
250 37.2 10.5 
760 7.4 1.89 
1070 3.1 .745 
250 5.3 1.888 
210 1.7 .441 












Source: Income figures are from World Bank Atlas, (Washington, 1977); 













OIL-RICH ARAB STATES (ORAS) PER CAPITA 
INCOME, OIL REVENUES AND 
POPULATION FOR 1975 

























Source: Oil Revenue figures are from Annual Statistical Bulletin, 
(Vienna, 1976); and population and income are from World 














GROSS/NET NATIONAL INCOME AND GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT OF JORDAN (EAST BANK) 
1967-1977 (Million JD) 












(1) Gross National Income including Foreign Aid 














(3) Gross Domestic Product = Consumption + Investment + Exports + 
Government Expenditures - Imports 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, XV (1979); 
United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, Vo1.7 · 
Individual Country Data 1977 (New York, 1978). 
R F 
Year (1) (2) 
1967 11.30 50.10 
1968 10.30 62.09 
1969 14.00 43.84 
1970 12.60 37.11 
1971 13.20 36.19 
1972 13.80 53.50. 
1973 23.20 59.51 
1974 32.00 76.40 
1975 63.90 140.00 
1976 140.80 127.00 
1977 145.90 166.00 
TABLE XXIX 
WORKERS' REMITTANCES, FOREIGN AID, A1~ 
EXPENDITURES ON NATIONAL INCOME OF 
JORDAN (EAST BANK) 
(IN MILLION JD) 
1967-1977 
X M c G 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
20.80 59.80 103.8 44.0 
18.90 73.60 127.4 55.9 
20.60 97.70 156.8 64.0 
17.60 76.80 152.8 58.7 
17.80 88.90 161.7 60.4 
37.00 117.80 177.4 68.3 
52.40 136.40 183.1 80.0 
80.30 196.10 199.8 97.7 












192.00 335.70 325.5 155.9 150.2 
242.00 546.20 412.8 156.6 206.8 
v D TX 
(8) (9) (10) 
-1.6 6.3 15.6 
.5 7.6 17.9 
3.9 7.7 20.9 
-3.1 7.7 19.7 
4.5 7.9 20.2 
6.0 8.1 24.4 
-8.0 8.3 29.4 
2.4 8.5 4.9 
.9 9.0 9.2 
12.2 10.0 43.2 
5.5 11.0 74.2 
(1) Remittances; (2) Foreign Aid; (3) Exports; (4) Imports; (5) Private Consumption; (6) Government 
Expenditures; (7) Private ToTal Investment (including inventory changes); (8) Inventory Changes; (9) De-
preciad.on; and (10) Indirect Taxes. 
Sources: United Nations, United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, Vol. I, Individual 























GROSS/NET NATIONAL INCOME AND 
GROSS/NET DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
JORDAN (EAST/WEST BANK) 
1960-1977 (MILLION JD) 
NNYD NY GGDP 
(2) (3) (4) 
122.420 101.59 98.29 
143.900 123.60 120.90 
144.600 125.70 119.00 
149.690 132.22 129.06 
178.000 154.70 149.00 
189.370 173.30 167.61 
195.300 178.80 170.80 
249.300 199.20 194.80 
251.160 189.07 186.90 
268.760 224.92 219.69 
251.210 214.10 209.86 
264.280 228.09 223.42 
307.480 253.98 249.16 
341.050 281.54 268.51 
439.699 363.30 341.91 
639.200 499.20 444.30 
860.500 733.50 602.70 






















(1) Gross National Disposable Income; (2) GNYD - Depreciation; 
(3) NY • NGDP + R; (4) GGDP • Consumption + Investment + Government 
Expenditure + Exports - Imports; (5) NGDP = GGDP - Depreciation. 
r 
R F 
Year (1) (2) 
1960 7.39 20.83 
1961 7.00 20.30 
1962 11.90 18.90 
1963 8.56 17.47 
1964 11.70 23.30 
1965 12.39 16.07 
1966 15.20 16.50 
1967 11.20 50.10 
1968 10.37 62.09 
1969 14.03 43.84 
1970 12.64 37.11 
1971 13.17 36.19 
1972 13.82 53.50 
1973 22.83 59.51 
1974 31.99 76.40 
1975 63.90 140.00 
1976- 1-40;80 127.00 
1977 145.90 166.00 
TABLE XXXI 
WORKERS' REMITTANCES, FOREIGN AID, AND 
EXPENDITURES ON NATIONAL INCOME OF 
JORDAN (EAST /WEST BANK) 
(IN MILLION JD) 
1960-1977 
X M c G 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
12.79 47.05 88.45 27.02 
17.60 46.60 102.80 28.10 
19.10 51.80 102.40 29.00 
20.26 61.06 116.82 33.04 
24.60 56.70 123.50 32.30 
28.54 63.55 138.04 36.79 
32.10 76.60 149.60 39.20 
27.70 63.70 158.50 46.40 
28.27 90.98 153.36 58.60 
32.26 108.69 164.47 67.08 
32.33 89.89 165.07 61.90 
20.78 93.01 183.00 64.53 
51.81 119.88 193.52 72.20 
50.29 136.36 220.00 83.41 
85.51 184.68 256.78 100.86 
207.90 403.70 404.70 125.10 
307.90 543.00 505.20 146.20 
358.30 656.20 5 77.70 170.20 
I v D 
(7) (8) (9) 
17.09 -.42 4.1 
19.00 2.00 4.3 
20.30 -1.7 5.2 
20.00 -.02 5.4 
25.30 6.5 6.0 
27.79 3.89 6.7 
26.50 -1.2 7.2 
25.90 -.60 6.8 
37.65 7.01 8.2 
64.57 25.21 8.8 
40.45 13.04 8.4 
48.12 14.70 8.5 
51.51 12.11 9.0 
51.17 -.13 9.8 
83.44 13.27 10.6 
110.40 -4.7 9.0 
186.40 00 10.0 
213.10 00 10.0 
(1) Remittances; (2) Foreign Aid; (3) Exports; (4) Imports; (5) Private Consumption; (6) Govern-
ment Expenditures; (7) Investment Expenditure (includes changes in inventory); (8) Changes in Inven-
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